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Justin Murray*
ABSTRACT

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that women have a right to
abortion under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court reasoned toward this conclusion by importing concepts and
concerns that are ordinarily associated with the Establishment Clause.
This Article is the first attempt to systematically describe, and critically
evaluate, the Court's use of Establishment Clause ideas in Roe and later
abortion cases.
Some brief background is essential in order to see how the Court
wove Establishment Clause themes into the structure of its Due Process
analysis. The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from
restricting fundamental constitutional liberties (such as abortion) unless
it has a compelling reason for doing so. States have defended their
abortion laws by arguing that protecting unborn human life against
homicide is a compelling reason to restrict abortion. This argument,
advanced in Roe, directly presented the Supreme Court with the
question of whether fetuses are human beings entitled to protection
against homicide.
The Court, however, refused to answer the question and provided
an ambiguous explanation for its refusal. Careful interpretation of these
hazy passages reveals the Court's underlying concern that neither the
judiciary nor the legislature may decide the question of fetal humanity
because the question is religious in nature and divides people along
religious lines. When the ambiguities are unraveled and the Court's
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rationale is plainly stated in this way, it becomes clear that Roe's method
of analysis incorporates the Establishment Clause requirement that
legislation must be based on a secular purpose and the (now-outdated)
Establishment Clause goal of alleviating political divisiveness along
religious lines.
The Court's analysis is misguided, however, because Establishment
Clause principles permit governmental protection of fetal life. The
humanity of the fetus can be plausibly based, not only on religious
grounds, but also on the secular grounds of philosophical, historical, and
experiential reasoning. To be clear, I do not argue that these secular
grounds prove beyond dispute that fetuses are human beings. Instead, I
defend the more modest proposition that a debatable secular case can be
made for viewing fetuses as human beings. This conclusion is not
sufficient to justify legal restrictions on abortion (which is not the point
of this Article), but it does show that such restrictions do not violate the
Establishment Clause, that the Court's implicit reliance on
Establishment Clause themes is misplaced, and that we should reopen
social and judicial dialogue about the ethical status of fetal life and the
constitutional status of abortion.
INTRODUCTION

In America's fierce debate about the morality and legality of
abortion, abortion-rights opponents are frequently criticized for seeking
to impose their religious views on others and for breaching the
separation between church and state. During the 2008 election
campaign, then-Senator Joe Biden indicated that although he considers
abortion morally wrong as a "matter of faith," he also finds it
inappropriate to "impose that judgment on everyone else" through legal
restrictions.' More recently, the efforts of Bart Stupak, Ben Nelson, and
other pro-life democrats to exclude abortion from health-care-reform
legislation have been widely characterized as "a brazen and frank
attempt to impose a minority's religious worldview on the entirety of
American healthcare." 2 Nor has the Supreme Court been left unscathed:
some critics attributed its 2007 decision upholding Congress's ban on

Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/26590488/page/4/.
2
Marci A. Hamilton, Why the Stupak Amendment to the HealthcareReform Bill Is
Unconstitutional,FINDLAW'S WRIT (Nov. 12, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/
20091112.html.
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partial-birth abortion 3 to the "telling" fact that five out of the nine
justices were Catholic.4
Concerns such as these have shaped not only popular discourse
about abortion, but constitutional discourse as well. Many critics of antiabortion laws have grounded their position in the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment, which states that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion."5 The late Justice Stevens, 6 prochoice litigants,7 and many scholars argue that abortion restrictions
"lack a secular purpose" and "place the state on one side of a political
issue which is divided along religious lines, thus violating the
[Elstablishment [C]1ause."8
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
Geoffrey R. Stone, Our Faith-Based Justices, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2007,
2:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.comlgeoffrey-r-stone/our-faithbased-justices b 46398.
html.
3

4
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Justice Stevens's Establishment Clause argument against abortion laws, as he
has articulated it in his judicial opinions, is discussed at greater length below. See infra
Parts I.B.3, II.C.3, and III.C. On at least one occasion, Justice Stevens advanced this sort
of argument outside of the context of a judicial opinion. See John Paul Stevens, The Bill of
Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 13, 30-33 (1992).
7 In many of the Supreme Court's leading abortion cases, one or more pro-choice
amici (and occasionally the pro-choice party) advanced an Establishment Clause challenge.
See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women Lawyers et al. at 47-55, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18 & 70-40); Brief of Appellees at 92, Harris v. McCrae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980) (No. 79-1268); Brief of Ams. United for Separation of Church and State
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490
(1989) (No. 88-605) (focusing entirely on the Establishment Clause); Brief of Amici Curiae
Religious Coal. for Reprod. Choice et al. at 6, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No.
99-830).
8 John Morton Cummings, Jr., Comment, The State, the Stork, and the Wall: The
Establishment Clause and Statutory Abortion Regulation, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1191, 1193
(1990); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 24-28 (1993); JOEL FEINBERG,
Abortion, in FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 37, 75 (1992); U.S.
6

COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE RIGHT TO LIMIT CHILDBEARING
35-36 (1975); PETER S. WENZ, ABORTION RIGHTS AS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 170-81 (1992);

Joel R. Cornwell, The Concept of Brain Life: Shifting the Abortion Standard Without
Imposing Religious Values, 25 DUQ. L. REV. 471, 473 (1987); David R. Dow, The
Establishment Clause Argument for Choice, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 479, 479-80
(1990); Robert L. Maddox & Blaine Bortnick, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Do
Legislative Declarations that Life Begins at Conception Violate the Establishment Clause?,
12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1989); Joseph S. Oteri et al., Abortion and the Religious
Liberty Clauses, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 559, 588-91 (1972); Larry J. Pittman,
Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Religion: The Ban on Federal Fundingas a Violation of
the Establishment Clause, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 131, 135 (2006); Stuart Rosenbaum,
Abortion, the Constitution, and Metaphysics, 43 J. CHURCH & STATE 707, 713-14 (2001);
Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 40-46 (2005); Paul
D. Simmons, Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy: Casey as "Catch-22", 42 J. CHURCH &
STATE 69, 69 (2000); Paul D. Simmons, Religious Liberty and the Abortion Debate, 32 J.
CHURCH & STATE 567, 568 (1990); Gila Stopler, 'A Rank Usurpationof Power"-The Role of
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The Supreme Court has never openly endorsed these efforts to base
abortion rights on the First Amendment. 9 Nonetheless, I show that
Establishment Clause concepts play a central, albeit veiled (and
therefore largely unnoticed), role in the Court's understanding of the
constitutional right to abortion.' 0 This Article provides a new way of
interpreting Roe v. Wade and subsequent abortion cases: the Court
implicitly relies upon First Amendment-type arguments to justify
abortion rights, but without ever explicitly referring to the First
Amendment. Because the Court's reliance on the Establishment Clause
is never directly acknowledged in the text of its abortion-rights opinions,
I call this dynamic the "underground Establishment Clause," or, for
convenience, the "UEC."
This reinterpretation of abortion-rights jurisprudence is particularly
timely in light of the new membership on the Court and Justice
Kennedy's uncertain and evolving views about abortion rights. In 1992,
Kennedy surprised many observers by authoring part of the plurality
opinion that reaffirmed Roe by a narrow margin." His portion of the
opinion heavily emphasized (what I will show to be) UEC themes: that

PatriarchalReligion and Culture in the Subordinationof Women, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 365, 391-93 (2008); Elizabeth Symonds, The Denial of Medi-Cal Funds for Abortion:
An Establishmentof Religion, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 421, 430-33 (1979); Karen F.B.
Gray, Comment, An Establishment Clause Analysis of Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 24 GA. L. REV. 399, 402 (1990); Sherryl E. Michaelson, Note, Religion and
Morality Legislation:A Reexamination of Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV.
301, 401-07 (1984); Note, New Jersey's Abortion Law: An Establishment of Religion?, 25
RUTGERS L. REV. 452, 453 (1971). Professor Laurence Tribe used to take this position, see
Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword:Toward a Model of Roles in
the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1, 19-24 (1973), but he has since
abandoned it, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 116 (1990).
9 The Court has only addressed an Establishment Clause objection in the abortion
context on one occasion. There, it held that the Hyde Amendment does not violate the
Establishment Clause. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980). In Part II.B below, I
explain why this holding clarifies, rather than contradicts, my thesis about the
underground Establishment Clause.
1e Some aspects of the connection between abortion-rights jurisprudence and the
Establishment Clause have been identified, and other aspects misidentified, in previous
scholarship. See Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and
Religious Schools, 104 HARv. L. REV. 989, 994-96 (1991). Professor McConnell argued that
Roe is to abortion what the Establishment Clause is to religion, because Roe demands that
the government remain neutral about abortion. Id. at 996. His analysis is on the right
track, but it is incomplete and, at points, inaccurate. As I will show, the Court does not
require complete governmental neutrality about abortion. It requires neutrality about one
important aspect of abortion: whether a pre-viable fetus is a human being. Nonetheless,
the Court permits most governmental restrictions on abortion short of those that treat previable fetuses like full-fledged human beings. This Article is an effort to explain that
discrepancy. See discussion infra Part II.
1 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 84546 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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pregnancy and abortion deeply implicate our most basic ethical and
religious ideas about "existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life," and therefore that the government must not
"mandate" its own moral view on the subject.12 More recently, however,
his opinions in Stenberg v. Carhartand Gonzales v. Carhart,the partialbirth-abortion cases, sharply turned against the UEC by emphasizing
the humanity of fetal life and by permitting the government to "take
sides in the abortion debate and come down on the side of life, even life
in the unborn."1 3 This Article will show how Kennedy's shifting views
about abortion rights relate to the UEC, and why his Carhart opinions
threaten the inner logic and future of Roe and the Court's other abortionrights decisions.14
The following provides a brief description of what the UEC is and
why it is problematic. The Court has located the constitutional right to
abortion in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 My
task, therefore, is to identify where Establishment Clause themes enter
into and influence the Court's Due Process reasoning.
One of the general principles of Due Process is that the government
may not infringe upon fundamental rights unless it can provide a
compelling reason for doing so.1 6 Once the Roe Court held that abortion
is a fundamental right,' 7 the only remaining option for Texas (the
respondent in Roe) to vindicate its abortion statute was to provide a
compelling justification for restricting abortion. To that end, Texas
offered the following rationale for its law: "the fetus is a human being
and the state has an interest in the arbitrary and unjustified destruction
of this being."' 8
The Court rebuffed Texas's asserted justification, but, interestingly,
it did not say that Texas erred in viewing fetuses as human beings
deserving of protection. The Court simply refused to answer the question
Id. at 850-51; see also discussion infra Part II.D.2.
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 961 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 144-45 (2007) ("[T]he government has a legitimate and
); see also discussion infra
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life .
Part II.E.
"4
See infra Part II.E. I also argue that Kennedy's usual method of Establishment
Clause interpretation-the coercion test-would readily find anti-abortion laws permissible
under the First Amendment, which suggests that he would probably abandon the UEC if
litigants and scholars manage to convince him of the underlying links between
Establishment Clause case law and abortion-rights jurisprudence. See infra Part I.A.3.
15 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see U.S. CONST. amend. X1V ("No State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .").
16 ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 767 (2d
ed. 2002).
17 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
18 Brief for Appellee at 9, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18).
12

13
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of "when [human] life begins," explaining, in part, that the question is
morally and religiously divisive and therefore cannot be appropriately
resolved by the judiciary. 19 The Court concluded that the legislature, too,
must not seek to answer the question in a way that precludes women
from answering it for themselves. 20
This line of reasoning closely parallels two of the central themes in
Establishment Clause case law: the requirement that all government
action must have a "secular legislative purpose,"21 and the idea (in vogue
at the time of Roe, but no longer) that "political division along religious
lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment
was intended to protect." 22 Roe did not condemn the government's
purpose of protecting the lives of unborn children for being false, but for
being quasi-religious and for dividing society along religious and ethical
fault lines. Although these Establishment Clause considerations were
decisive for the outcome in Roe, the Court kept the analysis underground
by omitting direct citation to or engagement with precedents and
limiting principles that might have led to a different outcome.
Justice Stevens and several commentators, by lifting the
Establishment Clause issue above ground, have provided a more
responsible and elaborate First Amendment objection to abortion
restrictions than the one suggested by the UEC. Many of these analyses
deliberately distinguish secular purposes from religious ones and explain
why the governmental interest in protecting pre-viable fetuses as human
persons falls in the latter category. They generally contend
(controversially) that religion is based on faith and authority, whereas
secular reasoning primarily employs three criteria: "logic," "history," and
"shared experiences." 23
I argue, however, that protecting fetuses as human persons can be
plausibly supported by all three of these criteria, and that a sufficiently
strong secular case can be made for restricting abortion to satisfy the
Establishment Clause. This does not necessarily mean that legislatures
should restrict abortion, or even that abortion rights should not receive
constitutional protection in some other form-both of these propositions
lie beyond the scope of this Article. Yet my conclusion does indicate that
the Supreme Court should revisit the foundations of abortion-rights
jurisprudence and provide a more thoughtful analysis of the ethical
status of fetal life.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 159-60.
See discussion infra Part II.A.4-5.
21 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
22 Id. at 622 (citing Paul A. Freund, Comment, Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969)).
23 E.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 779
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also discussion infra Parts I.B.3, II.C.3, and III.C.
19
20
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Part I provides necessary background on current Establishment
Clause doctrine and discusses various ways that this doctrine has been
applied to challenge abortion restrictions. Part II shows that the
arguments introduced in Part I also feature prominently in the Supreme
Court's abortion cases. Part III contends that protecting fetal personhood
does not violate the Establishment Clause, and that the Court should
put an end to the UEC. Part IV concludes.
I. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OBJECTIONS TO ABORTION RESTRICTIONS

The Establishment Clause says that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion."24 This concise text is profoundly
difficult to interpret, due to the ambiguity of the words "establishment"
and "religion." In this Part, I briefly describe the three primary methods
that various Supreme Court justices use to interpret the Establishment
Clause. I then introduce three ways that pro-choice commentators have
applied these interpretive methods to argue that abortion restrictions
violate the First Amendment. 25
A. Three Tests for Detecting Establishmentsof Religion
The three primary legal tests that courts and scholars use to figure
out whether governmental actions establish religion are commonly
known as the Lemon test, the symbolic-endorsement test, and the
coercion test. This Section briefly describes how each test works. One of
the three tests (coercion) does not supply any plausible objection to
abortion restrictions, so I will examine it in this Section and lay it aside
for the remainder of the Article. However, the other two tests (Lemon
and symbolic endorsement) provide initially-plausible pro-choice
arguments, so I will leave it to the next Section to spell out those
objections in detail.
1. The Lemon Test
The Lemon test has been the Supreme Court's leading approach to
the Establishment Clause for nearly four decades. In Lemon v.
Kurtzman, the Court held that a law is unconstitutional if any one of
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
In other words, this Article focuses on Establishment Clause arguments about
abortion that are based on currently-existing First Amendment doctrine, as well as the
leading minority views proposed by Supreme Court justices. In doing so, I do not mean to
imply that these are the only possible interpretations of the First Amendment, or even the
best interpretations. It is possible that future commentators will come up with a new
method of interpreting the Establishment Clause that differs from the approaches
addressed in this Article. If such an attempt is made, it may well require a different kind of
rebuttal than the ones that I provide to existing pro-choice Establishment Clause analyses
in Part III, infra.
24
25
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three circumstances is met: (1) if the law lacks a "secular legislative
purpose," (2) if its "primary effect" is to advance or inhibit religion, or (3)
if it creates an 'excessive government entanglement with religion."' 26
Lemon has been the subject of fierce debate and criticism, even among
Supreme Court justices, 27 and the Court has resolved many cases
without applying Lemon.2 8 Yet despite these controversies, Lemon has
not been overruled and it remains the leading judicial test for
determining whether governmental actions violate the Establishment
Clause. 29
The first part of the Lemon analysis condemns laws that are
motivated exclusively by religious purposes instead of secular ones.30 The
Court has only declared laws unconstitutional under the secular-purpose
standard in three contexts: governmental promotion of Creation Science
over evolution in public schools, 3 1 placing the Ten Commandments on
public property, 32 and providing a moment of silence for prayer in public
schools. 33 In the vast majority of cases, the Court has classified the
government's purpose as secular, including arguably borderline purposes
35
such as religious accommodation,3 4 solemnizing public events,

26 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968), and
quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
27 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 890 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (collecting criticisms of Lemon by himself and other justices).
28 See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (upholding legislative
prayer due to its historical longevity, without applying Lemon). Just two years after
Lemon, the Court suggested that the Lemon 'tests' are "no more than helpful signposts."
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
29 The Court recently reaffirmed the Lemon test, as interpreted by the symbolicendorsement test, and applied it to strike down a courthouse display of the Ten
Commandments. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 858, 861-63.
30
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 n.6 (1984) (clarifying that Lemon only
requires that laws be partially motivated by a "secular purpose," not that the government
must have '"exclusively secular' objectives").
31 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas,

393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968).
32 See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 881; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43
(1980) (per curiam). But cf. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (upholding
government-sponsored Ten Commandments display).
3 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-61 (1985).
3
See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (recognizing legitimate state interest in
religious accommodation).
See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[G]overnment
3
acknowledgments of religion serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the
legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the
future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society.").
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promoting sexual abstinence for teenagers, 36 and providing a "uniform
day of rest" through mandatory Sunday closing laws.37
Most Establishment Clause cases arise under the other two parts of
the Lemon test: the "primary effect" and "entanglement requirements."
Primary effect and entanglement cases generally deal with
governmental aid to religious institutions: parochial schools,38
religiously-affiliated service organizations,3 9 employers,40 and similar
entities. Even if such aid is provided for an indisputably secular
purpose, 41 it is often constitutionally suspect for two reasons. First, when
aid is offered to a religious organization to further a secular goal, the
organization might divert the aid toward religious activities, so that the
ultimate effect of the law is to advance religion. This is the primary
effect problem.42 Second, in order to avoid the primary effect problem,
the government might attach conditions and monitoring to ensure the
proper use of aid, giving rise to collaborative and supervisory
relationships that blur church-state boundaries and lead to
inappropriate mutual influence. This is the entanglement problem.43
2. The Symbolic-Endorsement Test
This sub-section introduces a close relative of Lemon called the
"symbolic endorsement" test.44 Symbolic endorsement does not abandon
the Lemon framework, but instead reinterprets its secular-purpose and
36 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988) ("AFLA was motivated
primarily, if not entirely, by a legitimate secular purpose-the elimination or reduction of
social and economic problems caused by teenage sexuality, pregnancy, and parenthood."
(citations omitted)); id. at 634 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I have no meaningful
disagreement with the majority's discussion of the AFLA's essentially secular purpose....").
3
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
38 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643-45 (2002) (addressing a
voucher program that includes religious schools).
3
See, e.g., Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 593 (addressing an abstinence-education grant
program that includes religious organizations).
40 See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1987) (addressing the applicability of Title VII
religion exemptions to the secular, nonprofit activities of a Mormon employer).
41 In most of these cases, the secular purpose of the law is not in doubt. See, e.g.,
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (recognizing legitimate state interest in
educational quality, including religious schools); Corp. of the PresidingBishop, 483 U.S. at
334 (recognizing legitimate interest in accommodating religion).
42 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
43 See id. at 619 ("A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that [aid conditions] are obeyed and the
First Amendment otherwise respected.").
44
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 1151. The symbolic-endorsement test originated
in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring), and the Court
has used it in numerous majority opinions, most recently in McCreary County v. ACLU,
545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
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primary-effect requirements. The secular-purpose requirement remains
largely the same as it was under Lemon: it condemns government
policies that intentionally favor some religions and disfavor others. The
reinterpreted primary-effect requirement is more novel and significant:
it condemns government actions if a reasonable person would perceive
those actions as favoring religion, even if the actions are not actually
motivated by religious favoritism.4 5
Typical examples of symbolic- endorsement problems involve
governmental promotion of prayer in public schools, 46 crosses on
government property, 47 or government-sponsored Christmas displays
that celebrate Christ's birth.4 8 In cases like these, the government is
arguably motivated solely by the secular purpose of celebrating
America's history and heritage.49 Yet despite secular intentions,
proponents of the endorsement test would deem the government's
actions unconstitutional as long as a reasonable person would perceive
the government's actions as favoring religion.50
3. The Coercion Test
Although Lemon and its symbolic-endorsement offshoot have long
been the leading methods for Establishment Clause inquiry, they remain
highly controversial.51 Many critics urge the Court to replace Lemon with

45
E.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Proponents of the
endorsement test agree on this much. They disagree, however, about how reasonable the
reasonable person must be. Compare Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 780-81 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the
reasonable observer "must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community
and forum in which the religious display appears"), with id. at 799-800 n.5 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the reasonable observer is a passerby who notices the
government's display, not Justice O'Connor's "well-schooled jurist"). A majority of the
Court embraced Justice O'Connor's formulation in McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 866.
46 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000) (applying
endorsement test to hold that public schools allowing student-initiated prayer at school
football games violates the First Amendment).
47 See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 798-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (applying endorsement
test to invalidate governmental permission for the KKK to place a Latin cross on
government property). But cf. id. at 772 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (applying endorsement test to reach the opposite result).
48 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598-601 (1989) (applying
endorsement test to hold that government-sponsored Christmas cr~che violates the First
Amendment). But cf. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (upholding a different cr&che display).
4 For one of the Court's many recognitions of the legitimacy of this purpose, see
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680-81.
So See text accompanying supra note 45.
5' See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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a coercion-oriented standard. 52 This sub-section addresses the coercionbased alternative to Lemon.
Unlike the other Establishment Clause frameworks, the coercion
test generally allows the government to promote religious ideas and
goals, as long as it does not force people to participate in religious
exercises.5 3 This view has three known advocates on the current Court:
Justices Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy.64 Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justices Alito, Sotomayor and Kagan, have not yet revealed their views
on the subject. When such a case comes before the Court, it is probable
that Alito and Roberts will adopt the coercion test, creating a slim
majority on the Court to overrule or seriously modify Lemon.55 (Very
little is known about the views of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, but
there are no indications that they would abandon Lemon in favor of a
coercion standard.5 6 ) Thus, although the coercion test represents a
52 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 940 (1986).
53
See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Our cases disclose two limiting principles:
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise;
and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits
to religion . . . ." (citation omitted)); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992)
("These dominant facts mark and control the confines of our decision: State officials direct
the performance of a formal religious exercise . .. for secondary schools." (emphasis added));
Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 261 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("The inquiry with respect to coercion must be whether the
government imposes pressure upon a student to participate in a religious activity.").
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy agree on this much, but they sometimes disagree
about what counts as "coercion." Compare Lee, 505 U.S. at 594 (Kennedy, J., opinion of the
Court) ("[G]overnment may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may
use more direct means."), with id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court invents a
boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion . . . .").
54 The Court unanimously agrees that coerced religious exercise is sufficient to
prove an Establishment Clause violation, but previous Court majorities have rejected the
Scalia-Thomas-Kennedy view that coercion is a necessary element. Compare Lee, 505 U.S.
at 587 (Kennedy, J., opinion of the Court) ("[A]t a minimum, the Constitution guarantees
that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise...."), with id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Although our precedents make
clear that proof of government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause
violation, it is sufficient.").
** See Julie F. Mead, Preston C. Green & Joseph 0. Oluwole, Re-examining the
Constitutionality of Prayer in School in Light of the Resignation of Justice O'Connor, 36 J.
L. & EDUC. 381, 394-98, 406 (2007).
56 See David M. Estes, Justice Sotomayor and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence:
Which Antiestablishment Standard Will Justice Sotomayor Endorse?, 11 RUTGERS J.L. &
REL. 525, 539 (2010) ("[Tihe depth of analysis and space she has devoted to the
Endorsement test suggests that Justice Sotomayor prefers the neutrality theory of the
antiestablishment principle."); ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON ELENA KAGAN 9-13
(2010) (summarizing the few available clues regarding Justice Kagan's interpretation of
the Establishment Clause).

12

REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1

minority position in the Court's existing jurisprudence, it could soon
become the majority position.
For that reason, it is worth examining whether a plausible objection
could be made to anti-abortion laws within the parameters of the
coercion test. No commentator has yet invoked the coercion test to argue
against abortion laws. The closest argument-and a common one-is
that abortion restrictions graft religiously-motivated ideas into the law
and "coerce[] into conformity" people from other religions who disagree.57
Some commentators have used a similar coercion based argument to
show that abortion restrictions violate the Free Exercise Clause. 8
This argument does focus on coercion, but not in the way that the
Establishment Clause coercion test calls for. The test does not ask
whether religiously- motivated laws coerce unwilled conduct (which
would effectively smuggle the Lemon secular-purpose inquiry into the
coercion test), but whether the act coerced by the government is a
"religious exercise."5 9 Even if opposition to abortion is based on religious
motivations, the act of carrying a pregnancy to term is not plausibly
characterized as a religious exercise: pregnancy, wanted or unwanted, is
an ordinary human experience that does not uniquely belong to any
religion at the exclusion of others. 60 However coercive anti-abortion laws
might be, they do not coerce religious exercise and therefore do not run
afoul of the coercion test.
Thus, the remainder of the Article will focus on the more plausible
pro-choice arguments that are based on Lemon and the symbolicendorsement test. Nonetheless, the conclusion of this sub-section-that
the coercion test leaves no room for a pro-choice Establishment Clause
challenge-has independent practical significance. Justice Kennedy, the
fence-sitter in abortion cases, is one of the judicial architects and
proponents of the coercion test. If my UEC interpretation of the Supreme

Cummings, supra note 8, at 1230 n.73.
See, e.g., Oteri et al., supranote 8, at 592-96.
See cases cited supra note 53. This feature of the coercion test makes it
vulnerable to the criticism that it makes the Establishment Clause redundant with the
Free Exercise Clause. See Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: ParadoxRedux, 1992 SUP. CT.
REV. 123, 134. It is not my purpose here to defend (or criticize) the coercion test, but only to
clarify how it is applied by those who adhere to it.
60 Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1992) (holding that prayer at a public
school graduation is a "state-directed religious exercise," but that severe facts like these
"mark and control the confines of our decision"); id. at 640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing coercion understood through historical examples or religious establishment as
"coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of
penalty. Typically, attendance at the state church was required; only clergy of the official
church could lawfully perform sacraments; and dissenters, if tolerated, faced an array of
civil disabilities.").
57
58
59
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Court's abortion precedents is correct, 61 then pro-life litigants and amici
should, in an appropriate case, try to persuade Kennedy to reject Roe's
implicit Lemon flavored analysis and apply his usual, coercion-oriented
inquiry instead. The predictable outcome of that inquiry, if Kennedy
were to undertake it, would be that abortion restrictions are
constitutionally permissible for purposes of the Establishment Clause. 62
This conclusion would provide him with an opening to re-examine the
foundations of abortion-rights jurisprudence.
B. Three Establishment Clause Objections to Restrictive Abortion Laws
Within the general framework of Lemon and the symbolicendorsement test, pro-choice commentators have articulated three
objections to restrictive abortion laws. First, abortion sharply divides
people of different religious persuasions, and the primary political
support for restrictive abortion laws comes from religious believers;
therefore, such laws are unconstitutional. 6 3 For convenience, I call this
the "political divisiveness" argument.6 4
Second, the morality of abortion involves a variety of fundamental
questions about human existence and ethics, such as: what is man; why
do we value him; and, when does developing human life become morally
valuable? Political resolution of ultimate human concerns such as these
is inappropriate, because such issues lie within the domain of religion,
not government.65 This is the "ultimate concerns" argument.6 6
Third, opposition to abortion is based on faith and obedience to
religious precepts, not secular forms of reasoning and justification. The
Constitution requires laws to be based on secular ways of thinking about

See infra Part II.
I will later argue, in Part III, infra, that abortion restrictions are constitutionally
permissible even under a Lemon or symbolic-endorsement approach to the Establishment
Clause. My only point for the time being is that the constitutional validity of anti-abortion
laws is more obvious under the coercion test than it is under Lemon, and therefore that
proponents of the coercion test-such as Kennedy-may be quicker than other justices to
reject the UEC.
63 See infra Part I.B.1.
64 The phrase is not my own. It has been used extensively in Supreme Court
decisions and scholarly commentary. For an elaborate discussion of the politicaldivisiveness concept in the Establishment Clause context, see Richard W. Garnett,
Religion, Division,and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667 (2006).
65
See infra Part I.B.2.
66 Like political divisiveness, "ultimate concerns" is a well-established judicial and
scholarly position on the definition of religion, based on the Supreme Court's conscientiousobjector cases. See Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the
Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 267-72 (1989).
61

62
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the world, not religious ones.67 This is the "faith-versus-reason"
argument.
These three arguments require careful exposition in this Section,
because the central theses of this Article-that the Supreme Court's
abortion-rights opinions use much the same arguments, and that these
arguments are misguided-revolve around them.
1. Political Divisiveness
The first and most common argument for why restrictive abortion
laws violate the Establishment Clause is the political-divisiveness
argument. The doctrinal foundation for the divisiveness argument lies in
Supreme Court decisions from the 1970s, most notably Lemon. In
Lemon, Chief Justice Burger argued that "political division along
religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First
Amendment was intended to protect."68 Although ordinary political
debate is "normal and healthy" in a democracy, he argued that political
issues where people's "votes aligned with their faith" are "a threat to the
normal political process." 6 9 Consequently, he argued that the "divisive
political potential" of a law is evidence that it unconstitutionally
entangles church and state. 70
More recently, a bare majority of the Supreme Court has completely
rejected these earlier concerns about the political divisiveness of
religion.7 ' Furthermore, the Court has unanimously agreed that
divisiveness alone is not sufficient to prove an Establishment Clause
violation: something more must be shown. 72 Nonetheless, a minority of

See infra Part I.B.3.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (citing Freund, supra note 22, at
1692). But see Garnett, supra note 64, at 1670 ("It is both misguided and quixotic, then, to
employ the First Amendment to smooth out the bumps and divisions that are an
unavoidable part of the political life of a diverse and free people and, perhaps, best
regarded as an indication that society is functioning well.").
69 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. For Burger, religion-related political division threatens
to replicate the troubled "history" of persecution that results when religion and government
converge, and it also "divert[s] attention from the myriad issues and problems" that
Americans of all religions can rationally debate and potentially agree upon. Id. at 623.
70 Id. at 622.
71 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 n.7 (2002) (Rehnquist,
C.J., delivering the opinion of the Court, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas,
JJ.) ('"The dissent resurrects the concern for political divisiveness that once occupied the
Court but that post-Aguilar cases have rightly disregarded."' (quoting Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793, 825 (2000) (plurality opinion))).
72 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) ("[Tlhis Court has not held
that political divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct.");
id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Piolitical divisiveness along religious lines should
not be an independent test of constitutionality."); id. at 703 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Of
67

68
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the justices continues to view divisiveness as a significant factor in
Establishment Clause analysis, 73 and unease about religion-related
conflict is widespread in contemporary American political discourse
generally,74 and in the abortion debate specifically.
When applied to abortion, the basic form of the political-divisiveness
argument is that the "major force behind the antiabortion movement is a
large and well organized group of religious organizations"; therefore,
anti-abortion laws violate the Establishment Clause.75 Three variations
of the argument all fit within this core template. The first variation
grounds political-divisiveness concerns in the entanglement part of the
Lemon test, as Chief Justice Burger had done in his Lemon opinion.76
The entanglement variation argues that due to the "pervasive"
involvement of "organized religious groups" in the abortion controversy,
governmental anti-abortion efforts result in "'a union of government and
77
religion [that] tends to destroy government and to degrade religion."'
The second variation relies on the symbolic-endorsement framework
instead.78 This argument states that, in light of the religious divisions
surrounding the abortion issue, a reasonable observer would "perceive"
anti-abortion laws as reflecting governmental favoritism toward
"theologically conservative view[s] on abortion."79 As a result, such laws
enable "Roman Catholics and fundamentalist Christians" to view
themselves as "political 'insiders,' whereas they make other religious
and nonreligious groups feel "alienated" and "condemned" as "political
'outsiders."'so
course, the Court is correct to note that we have never held that the potential for
divisiveness alone is sufficient to invalidate a challenged governmental practice .... .").
73 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 709 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting,
joined by Ginsburg, J.) ("Government's obligation to avoid divisiveness and exclusion in the
religious sphere is compelled by the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses . . . .");
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 717-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (writing separately to emphasize that
"protecting the Nation's social fabric from religious conflict" is a fundamental purpose of
the First Amendment).
74 See Garnett, supra note 64, at 1675-76.
7
See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 8, at 1231-32.
76 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
7
Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, supra note 8, at 22, 23 (quoting Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
78 This should be no surprise, because the endorsement test relies on many of the
same premises and concerns" as Lemon's political-divisiveness analysis: "asking whether a
reasonable observer would regard herself as having been cast by state action as an outsider
in the political community seems consonant with, if not equivalent to, asking whether that
same state action does or could cause political divisiveness." Garnett, supra note 64, at
1699-1700.
7
Gray, supra note 8, at 415-16.
s0 Id. at 416 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
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A third variation sees the intense religious divisions regarding
abortion as circumstantial evidence that anti-abortion laws are
motivated by religion, in violation of the Lemon secular-purpose
requirement. This inference appears to lurk as an inchoate suspicion in
the background of many, perhaps even most, Establishment Clause
objections to abortion laws. 8' Several pro-choice commentators have
made the point more directly by arguing, for instance, that "religious
values [such as anti-abortion sentiment] can be recognized," and
distinguished from secular "cultural values," by "the presence of truly
radical divisiveness surrounding them."82
2. Ultimate Concerns
The ultimate-concerns argument is based on the secular-purpose
requirement of the Lemon test. Secular-purpose arguments about
abortion are complicated by a crucial gap in existing case law: the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause decisions, including those
involving the secular-purpose requirement, have never explained how to
distinguish a religious purpose from a secular one. In the few situations
where the Court has struck down a law for lack of a secular purpose,83
the Court never had to confront the thorny question of how to define and
differentiate secular and religious purposes.
In each of those cases, one party accused the government of having
a clearly religious purpose (for example, teaching Creationism in order to
advance the Bible's creation story), and the government defended by
claiming that its real purpose is a different, clearly secular one (for
example, teaching Creationism to promote the findings of objective
biological science, or to promote diversity of ideas). 84 The Court's only
task was to figure out, largely by looking to legislative history, whether
the government's stated (secular) purpose was its actual purpose, or
whether the stated purpose was a "sham" to disguise its true, religious
purpose.85
81 A shocking number of pro-choice commentators emphasize, as their primary or
exclusive evidence that abortion restrictions are based on religious purposes rather than
secular ones, the fact that most people who strongly oppose abortion are Christian. See,
e.g., Gray, supra note 8, at 417-18.
82 Dow, supra note 8, at 497.
83 As I discussed previously, the only programs that the Supreme Court has struck
down on secular-purpose grounds are: governmental support for Creationism in public
schools, providing a moment of silence for prayer in public schools, and posting the Ten
Commandments. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
8
These were the conflicting claims about the government's purposes in Aguillard,
482 U.S. at 585-94.
85 E.g., id. at 586-87 ("While the Court is normally deferential to a State's
articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be
sincere and not a sham.").
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Abortion restrictions present a different kind of problem. The
relevant dispute over abortion is not about whether the government's
stated secular purpose is a sham to conceal its true, religious purpose.
There is general agreement that the government's purpose is to protect
fetal life, based on the belief that fetuses are human beings. 86 Instead,
the problem is figuring out whether this goal is best understood as
secular or religious. Thus, pro-choice commentators must look beyond
Supreme Court secular-purpose case law to other legal (and non-legal)
sources to distinguish between religious and secular purposes. The
ultimate-concerns argument provides one way to fill in this gap; the
faith-versus-reason argument examined in the next sub-section is
another.
The legal roots of the ultimate-concerns approach lie in the
Supreme Court's conscientious-objector cases, which held that religious
belief includes any belief that "is sincere and meaningful" and "occupies
a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox
belief in God."87 These cases involved statutory interpretation, not
constitutional interpretation, and the central issues more closely
resembled Free Exercise Clause problems than Establishment Clause
ones.88 Nonetheless, most federal courts of appeals have applied the
holdings of those cases in both Free Exercise Clause and Establishment

86 There are some scholars who dispute the government's real purpose, arguing that
nobody really believes that fetuses are persons or full-fledged human beings. According to
Professor Dworkin, the proposition that the fetus is a person with rights is neither secular
nor religious; rather, it is obviously false, and it is not the government's real purpose. His
complex argument, briefly summarized, is that virtually nobody, even religious pro-lifers,
actually believes that a pre-viable fetus is a person or has any rights of its own. The real
issue motivating the abortion debate is competing ideas about the intrinsic value, meaning,
and sacredness of human life; yet the intrinsic value of human life is a religious question.
Therefore, the government violates the Establishment Clause when it restricts abortion
based on one sectarian understanding of why human life is valuable. See DWORKIN, supra
note 8, at 24-28. There are many ways to respond to this argument, and this Article
provides one way: the personhood of a pre-viable fetus can be defended plausibly even
using only secular modes of reasoning. See discussion infra Part II.B.
87 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965); see also Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (holding that even a "purely ethical or moral" belief is
religious if it imposes upon the individual a "duty of conscience" that parallels the
"strength of traditional religious convictions"). But cf. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 441, 443, 455 (1971) (holding that the conscientious-objector exemption does not apply
to a Catholic who objects to some wars (Vietnam) but not all wars).
88 The question presented for the Court in the conscientious-objector cases was the
statutory definition of religion under the Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1958),
not the First Amendment. Nonetheless, most commentators agree that the outcome in
these cases is strained as a matter of statutory interpretation, and that an evolving
constitutional conception of religion is what actually produced the Court's conclusions. See,
e.g., Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1064
(1978) (citing Seeger, 380 U.S. at 174, 188).
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Clause contexts. These lower courts define religion to mean a
"comprehensive" worldview that provides answers to "fundamental"
questions about human life, communicated through hierarchical
institutions, sacred texts, ritual practices, and other indicia.89
Some scholars have referred to this approach as the "ultimate
concerns" definition of religion, because it identifies "religious" beliefs as
whichever beliefs involve the most fundamental and all-encompassing
(i.e., ultimate) concerns of the believer.90 This development in
Establishment Clause doctrine closely parallels an influential trend
within contemporary liberal political theory, which holds that
"comprehensive" theories of morals and metaphysics (the paradigm of
which is religion) are illegitimate grounds for political argument and
governmental action.9 1 According to many prominent liberal theorists,

the "constitutive political morality" of liberalism is "that political
decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of any particular
conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life."92 The
fundamental principle of the liberal state is that individuals should be
allowed "to make the sense they can of their place in the universe" and,
therefore, that the government must not attempt to "solve the final
mysteries of life."93
Numerous pro-choice commentators have applied the ultimateconcerns definition of religion and/or the closely related framework of
liberal political theory to the abortion context. The most common
89 The leading judicial approaches, which share much in common, originated in
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207-10 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring in the
judgment), and United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1502-04 (D. Wyo. 1995), aff'd,
95 F.3d 1475, 1482-84 (10th Cir. 1996) (adopting the district court's method for defining
religion); see also Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to Define Religion
Under the First Amendment and the Contributionsand Insights of Other Disciplines of
Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83 N.D. L.
REV. 123, 173-76 (2007) (summarizing the various ways federal circuit courts have defined
religion).
90 E.g., Ingber, supra note 66, at 268 (quoting Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of
Religion, supranote 88, at 1077 n. 113).
91 Among contemporary liberal theorists, John Rawls argued that civic debate
about justice should not resort to "comprehensive doctrines" about which reasonable
citizens disagree. Instead, we should ground political deliberation in an "overlapping
consensus" that reasonable citizens can agree upon without reference to their different
comprehensive worldviews. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xx-xxi (1993). Although
Rawls's idea has been vastly influential, many critics have argued that his version of
political liberalism is not only undesirable, but also incoherent. See, e.g., John M. Breen,
Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and Catholic Social Thought, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 513, 552 (2009) ("Even liberal regimes inevitably make use of some theory of the
good in the formulation of law, thus exposing the liberal exclusion of alternative
conceptions of the good as arbitrary and unprincipled.").
92 E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MA'IER OF PRINCIPLE 191-92 (1985).
9
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 347-48 (1980).
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argument along these lines is that concern for fetal life (and particularly
the view that the fetus is a human person) is based on "[a]bstract
metaphysical speculation" that is appropriate for "theology" but
inappropriate in the context of democratic politics. 9 4 Professor Ronald
Dworkin sounded a variation on this theme, claiming that anti-abortion
laws are unconstitutional because they require the government to take
sides on several different "fundamentally" "religious" issues: "the
ultimate point and value of human life," "why life has intrinsic
importance," and "how that value is respected or dishonored in different
circumstances."96

3. Faith Versus Reason
Justice Stevens and other commentators propose a different way to
fill the gap in secular-purpose case law and to bring that case law to bear
against abortion restrictions. Their concern is very different from that of
the ultimate-concerns commentators: they do not focus on the type of
question (fundamental questions) abortion restrictions seek to answer,
or the scope of the worldview (comprehensive worldviews) from which
citizens derive their views about abortion. In fact, these commentators
seek to provide secular answers to the exact same question that abortion
opponents seek to answer: when does the fetus become a human being?96
Instead, their objection is that the pro-life answer to that question
relies upon religious modes of thinking rather than rational, secular
modes.97 They argue that religious beliefs derive from faith and
obedience to doctrinal authority, whereas secular beliefs are the product
of secular forms of reasoning, such as "logic," "history," and "shared
experiences."98 They contend that protecting pre-viable fetuses cannot be
plausibly defended on the basis of secular reasoning, so governmental
actions to advance that goal violate the Establishment Clause.99
4. A Clarification
For the sake of simplicity, this Article has referred generically to
Establishment Clause objections to restrictive abortion laws. The precise
E.g., Simmons, Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy, supranote 8.
DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 164-65.
96
See, e.g., WENZ, supra note 8, at 180 ("After twenty-eight weeks ... there are
grounds in secular values for attributing personhood to the fetus. . . .").
9
See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
778 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I recognize that a powerful theological argument can
be made for [protecting fetal life throughout pregnancy], but I believe our jurisdiction is
limited to the evaluation of secular state interests.").
98 Id. at 779.
9 See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 569 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94

95
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objection is narrower and more complicated, and I will clarify it in this
sub-section. The primary complaint of commentators and the Supreme
Court is about unduly burdensome abortion laws that protect pre-viable
fetuses.100 Roe generally permits governmental restriction of abortion
after viability,10 1 and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey even allows for the regulation of abortion prior to viability, as
long as the regulations do not create an "undue burden" on the abortion
right. 102 Thus, the Court distinguishes between pre-viability and postviability abortion regulation, and again between burdensome and nonburdensome pre-viability regulations.
The Establishment Clause objections reviewed in this Part draw
similar distinctions. According to most of the commentators making
these objections, secular goals might justify protecting fetuses once they
reach approximately viability, but not before that point. The
commentators differ in the reasons they give for why viability is morally
significant from a secular point of view, and some believe that viability
itself is less important than other fetal developments (such as sentience),
which approximately coincide with viability.103 In spite of this squabble,
they generally agree that the morally significant point in fetal
development occurs at or about viability, and that protecting fetuses
after viability, but not before, can be supported with secular
justifications.
Because the Supreme Court's abortion cases also take this shapecondemning intrusive pre-viability regulations, but not regulations that
protect viable fetuses-the structure of the Court's UEC, if it exists at
all, should be expected to share this structural complexity. It will not
categorically dismiss opposition to all abortions as religious. Instead, it
will be targeted at particular reasons (state interests) for regulating
abortion, recognizing some governmental purposes as legitimate and
secular, but others as impermissible. With these expectations in mind,
we now turn to Part II and the UEC.

100 See, e.g., id. (acknowledging a powerful state interest in viable, fully sentient
fetuses, but denying a comparable secular interest for embryos). This is not uniformly true:
some pro-choice commentators reject the significance of viability. See, e.g., WENZ, supra
note 8, at 181.
101 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
102 505 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1992) (plurality opinion).
103 Compare Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, supra note 8, at 27 (arguing that
viability is intrinsically important because once a fetus can live on its own outside the
womb, abortion unnecessarily kills a fetus that could just as easily be delivered and
survive), with DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 17 (arguing that approximately viability is
important because the fetus develops sentience around that point in its development).
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II. THE UNDERGROUND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The previous Part introduced a variety of arguments that
commentators have advanced to show that restrictive abortion laws
violate the Establishment Clause. This Part reveals that the Supreme
Court invoked strikingly similar arguments to justify the constitutional
right to abortion. These arguments constitute an underground
Establishment Clause, in the sense that the Court never openly relied on
the Establishment Clause as the source of its analysis. Instead, the
Court purported to rely entirely on the Due Process Clause. 04
Therefore, the task of this Part is to dig beneath the surface of the
text and to reveal how the Court wove Establishment Clause themes into
the fabric of its Due Process analysis. I trace this phenomenon from its
beginnings in Roe v. Wade and show how the idea evolved in later cases.
The Part concludes by showing how the Court's most recent abortion
decision, Gonzales v. Carhart,'0 represents a substantial retreat from
the UEC approach to abortion rights.
A. Roe v. Wade
1. Background
In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the choice to obtain an abortion
is a fundamental liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.1os
Most commentary about Roe focuses on that part of the Court's
holding.107 However, finding that a particular activity is a "fundamental
liberty" does not end the constitutional inquiry. Even when the Court
finds that a fundamental right is at stake, the government may intrude
on that right if it has a "compelling" justification for doing so.' 08 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the Court in Roe, acknowledged that this general
principle holds true in the abortion context. 0 9 The focus of this Section,
and the place where the Roe UEC reveals itself most clearly, is the
second part of the Court's Due Process inquiry: whether the government
has a "compelling interest" for regulating abortion that is sufficient to
override the "fundamental liberty" of women to acquire an abortion.

See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
107 For a collection of numerous criticisms of Roe, most of which focus on the
privacy/liberty holding, see Teresa Stanton Collett, JudicialModesty and Abortion, 59 S.C.
L. REV. 701, 702 n.3 (2008).
108 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16 at 767.
109 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the
Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling
state interest' . . . ." (citations omitted)).
104
105
106
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The Texas government's appellate brief in Roe vigorously argued
that prohibiting abortion has a compelling justification: "the fetus is a
human being," and therefore the state must protect it against "arbitrary
and unjustified destruction." 10 The government also advanced an even
more ambitious argument: not only do legislatures have a compelling
interest in protecting fetuses (which gives them constitutional
permission to do so), but they also are constitutionally required by the
Equal Protection Clause"' to protect unborn human lives the same as
they protect other citizens.112 Blackmun acknowledged that if unborn
children are "persons" for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, the
case for abortion rights "collapses."" 3
2. The State's Argument that Fetuses Are "Persons" Under the
Fourteenth Amendment
Blackmun replied to these two arguments separately and distinctly.
He directly rejected the Texas government's Equal Protection argument,
holding that a fetus is not a "person" under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 114 He argued that the Amendment's framers did not intend
for it to apply to unborn persons, and that in other places where the
Constitution speaks of "persons," the term is expressly limited to (or only
makes sense in application to) born persons. 1 5 No Supreme Court justice
has ever disagreed with this part of the holding in Roe,116 although
several scholars have done so powerfully. "

110 Brief for Appellee, supra note 18, at 9.

ut U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Nor] shall any State ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
112 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 18, at 56. Several amici advanced this point in
greater detail. See, e.g., Brief of Ams. United for Life, Amicus Curiae, In Support of
Appellee at 4-10, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18).
113 Roe, 410 U.S. at 156.
114 Id. at 157.
115 Id. at 157-58.
116 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
913 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117 See, e.g., James S. Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth-Century Abortion
Statutes and the FourteenthAmendment, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 29, 31 (1985) (arguing for fetal
personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment on historical grounds); Charles I. Lugosi,
Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same
Thing in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 119, 119-22 (2006)
(arguing for fetal personhood primarily based on egalitarian political theory). However,
most scholars support Blackmun's conclusion that fetuses are not "persons" under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and OriginalMeaning, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 291, 338 (2007).

2010]

EXPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IN ABORTION CASES

23

3. The State's Scientific/Philosophical Argument That Fetuses Are Persons
Blackmun's refusal to recognize fetuses as "persons" under the
Fourteenth Amendment was based entirely on technical considerations,
such as the text, structure, and (to a lesser extent) history of that
constitutional provision.118 He did not argue that fetuses are actually
non-persons, nor did he apply the scientific, philosophical, or intuitionbased reasoning that would be necessary for determining whether
fetuses are actually persons.
Thus, Blackmun rightly acknowledged that his resolution of the
Equal Protection issue "does not of itself fully answer" the State's other
argument 19 : that scientific and philosophical reasoning proves the
humanity and personhood of fetuses, and therefore that the State has a
compelling justification for protecting them against abortion.120 The
humanity of fetal life, if it were established as a fact, would supply the
State with constitutional permission to restrict abortion,121 even if the
Equal Protection Clause does not require that it do so.
How, then, did Blackmun answer the State's scientific and
philosophical arguments that fetuses are human beings? As it turns out,
he refused to give an answer: "We need not resolve the difficult question
of when life begins."122 It is here, in his refusal to answer the State's
most pressing defense, that the UEC comes into play.
However, it will take some work to prove my claim, because the
surrounding text, where Blackmun attempts to justify his approach, is
riddled with ambiguity. The next sub-section will propose and defend my
UEC interpretation of the text; afterwards, I will address other, nonUEC explanations for Blackmun's method, ultimately concluding that
the UEC is an essential part of the explanation (but not the entire
explanation) for why Blackmun rejects the State's compelling interest in
protecting fetal life.
4. Establishment Clause Themes in Roe
The core justification that Blackmun provided for refusing to say
when life begins is, implicitly, an Establishment Clause argument that
blends together the three objections introduced in Part I. He emphasized
the religion-related divisions surrounding the issue of fetal personhood
argument), the profound ethical and
(a political-divisiveness
118

119

Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
Id. at 159.

See Brief for Appellee, supra note 18, at 29-57.
Compare CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 767, with Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 ("Where
certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these
rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest' . . . ." (citations omitted)).
122 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
120
121
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anthropological content of that issue (an ultimate-concerns argument)
and, to a lesser extent, the impossibility of resolving it with secular
methods of reasoning (a faith-versus-reason argument).123
Immediately after declaring that he "need not resolve" the question,
Blackmun explained that "[w]hen those trained in the respective
disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at
any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer."124 He
further contended that the "wide divergence of thinking" and the
"sensitive and difficult" nature of the question were "sufficient" to justify
his refusal to give an answer. 125
Blackmun did not spell out precisely why he found these divisions
sufficient to reject the State's assertion that fetuses are human beings.
The fact that he discussed divisions within the discipline of medicine,
and not only in those of theology and philosophy, tends to support a nonUEC reading of the text (which I will explore below). However, his
references to the sensitive nature of the fetal-personhood question and
the impossibility of addressing it with knowledge rather than
speculation are central rhetorical and conceptual themes in the ultimateconcerns and faith-versus-reason arguments about abortion. 126 These
themes are less plausibly explained by the non-UEC interpretation that
I will discuss later on.
More importantly, although Blackmun did briefly discuss divisions
of opinion among scientists, he devoted the bulk of the section to
cataloguing divisions among religions or quasi-religious philosophical
systems. He described the view of the ancient Stoics, most Jews, and
many Protestant groups that life begins at live birth; the Aristotelian
and medieval Catholic view that ensoulment occurs at some point during
pregnancy; the modern Catholic view that life begins at conception; and
the varied opinions of scientists, some saying that life begins at
conception, others at viability, and still others at birth.127

123 See generally supra Part I.B (describing the political divisiveness, ultimate
concerns, and faith versus reason arguments against abortion restrictions).
124 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
125 Id. at 160.
126 Id. at 159, 160 (citing Motion of American Ethical Union et al. for Leave to file a
Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of the Appellant's Position, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973) (No. 70-40), and Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18) [hereinafter Motion of American

Ethical Union et al.]; LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION,
AND INTERPRETATION 16 (1943); DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1689 (24th
ed. 1965); LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION, 97-99 (1966); DAVID M. FELDMAN, BIRTH CONTROL

IN JEWISH LAW 251-94 (1968); L. M. HELLMAN & J. A. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS
493 (14th ed. 1971)).
127 See id. at 160-61.
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Several of the historical sources that Blackmun cited in this
paragraph provide further insight into why he found the divergence of
opinion among religions to be significant. To begin with, consider
Lawrence Lader. In a 1966 book entitled Abortion, Lader argued that
"abortion forces us to face absolutes that intrude on religious dogma,"
and that "dogma becomes political where it has the power to make its
votes felt."128 The chapter of the book that Blackmun relied upon in this
section of Roe sought to describe (and critically evaluate) Catholic,
Jewish, and Protestant views about abortion.129 According to Lader, the
"conflicting positions of our three major faiths on the beginnings of life"
enable us to see how "U.S. abortion laws" are "linked inextricably" with
the "religious" question of when a fetus "become[s] a human being,
infused with a rational soul."130 Specifically, he concluded that the
Catholic view about fetal life has "maintained an inexplicable influence"
over the development of Protestant moral theology and American
abortion law.'13
Furthermore, to support his observation that "organized
[Protestant] groups that have taken a formal position on the abortion
issue have generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience of
the individual and her family," Blackmun cited an amicus brief written
by a variety of religious and humanist organizations.13 2 The central
contention of the brief is that abortion is a "matter of individual
conscience to be exercised within the context of one's own faith," "free of
unwarranted governmental interference." 133 These amici saw the
intrusion of abortion restrictions upon "'freedom of conscience'". not only
as a Free Exercise Clause violation, but also as a breach of the
Establishment Clause.134 The Establishment Clause problem consists in
"the fact that religious beliefs [underlie] the retention of abortion laws,"
because such laws "in effect codif[y] 'the official Roman Catholic view'
that assigns an undefined value to foetal life from the moment of
conception."135
128 LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION 2 (1966).
129 Blackmun cited Lader twice in the paragraph of Roe on which I am currently
focusing, see Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 n. 57-58, and numerous times elsewhere in the opinion,
see id. at 130 n.9, 132 n.17, n.21, 135 n.26, 139 n.33, 149 n.44.
130 LADER, supra note 128, at 94.
131 Id. at 101-02.
132 Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (citing Motion of American Ethical Union et al. supra note
126)..
133 Motion of American Ethical Union et al. supra note 126 at 4-5.
134 Id. at 34 (quoting Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79
HARv. L. REV. 56, 162, 165 (1965)).
135 Id. at 32-33 (quoting Rosen v. Louisiana Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 318 F. Supp. 1217,
1223 & n.2, 1231 n.18 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated, 412 U.S. 902 (1973)).
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To be clear, Blackmun did not directly quote these passages from
the amicus brief or Lader's book. He cited those sources for the purpose
of showing the wide divergence of religious opinion about fetal life,
without explaining why he saw that divergence as significant. His
sources are more forthright about the moral and legal significance of the
wide divergence of opinion on abortion: for them, the divergence reveals
that American abortion laws are "linked inextricably" to religious views
about the fetus36 and therefore violate the Establishment Clause.137
These passages provide clues as to Blackmun's serious, yet undisclosed,
reason for emphasizing religious divisions about fetal life.
Finally, Roe's refusal to say when life begins should be read in
conjunction with the introduction to the opinion, which reveals
Blackmun's deep concern about the religion-related political divisions
and the ultimate ethical/religious considerations associated with
abortion.138 After briefly stating the procedural posture of the case,
Blackmun opened the opinion by expressing his "awareness of the
sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the
vigorous opposing views, . . . and of the deep and seemingly absolute

convictions that the subject inspires."'13 Moreover, he observed that a
person's "philosophy," "experiences," "religious training," and "moral
standards" all shape our views about abortion. 140
He contrasted these problematic and divisive dimensions of the
abortion debate from what the Court must do: "Our task, of course, is to
resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of
predilection."141 He elaborated on this aspect of the judicial role by
quoting one of the famous passages from Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes's dissent in Lochner u. New York. 142 In the quoted passage,
Holmes argued that "[the Constitution] is made for people of
fundamentally differing views," and therefore that justices should
bracket their personal views about morality and politics when making
judgments about the meaning of the Constitution.143
This introduction communicates two ideas with clarity and urgency.
First, Blackmun was deeply worried about the deep and sensitive
136 LADER, supra note 128, at 94.
137 See Motion of American Ethical Union et al., supra note 126, at 31-34.

18 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
139 Id.
140
141

Id.
Id.

142 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
143 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 117 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)

(Holmes, J., dissenting)). For a discussion of the extraordinary influence that the story of
Lochner and its demise have had for future generations of lawyers and judges, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873-74 (1987).
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religious and ethical divisions about abortion in American society.
Consequently, he sought to ameliorate those divisions by exiling them
from the domain of constitutional law and politics, which must be "free of
emotion and of predilection." 144 This feature of Blackmun's argument
parallels the political divisiveness argument from the Establishment
Clause context.
Second, he emphasized that people's views about abortion are
formed by our most fundamental concerns in life: "One's philosophy,
one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence,
one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and family and their
values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe."145
These conceptual concerns and rhetorical emphases directly parallel
those of the ultimate concerns argument against abortion restrictions.
5. An Alternative Interpretation of Roe
This sub-section presents and evaluates another potential
interpretation-a non-UEC reading-of the texts from Roe discussed
above. For the non-UEC interpretation, the divisions and controversy
surrounding the question of when life begins has little to do with the
Establishment Clause, and everything to do with the government's
burden of proof. Under the Court's normal method in Due Process cases,
whenever the government intrudes on fundamental liberties (recall that
Roe had already held that the abortion right is a fundamental one146), it
bears the difficult burden of providing a compelling justification for
depriving that liberty.' 7 Widespread disagreement about when life
begins tends to show that the State's interest is not entirely convincing
and therefore not compelling. Thus, the non-UEC interpretation would
suggest that Blackmun was doing precisely what he purported to do:
applying the Court's usual substantive due process methodology to the
problem of abortion.
There is considerable textual support for this burden-of-proof
interpretation, and it does appear to be one of the underlying reasons
why Blackmun considered divisions of opinion to be so important. In
particular, the burden of proof interpretation helps to explain why
Blackmun discussed scientific disagreements about when life begins and,
in the following paragraph, the variety of legal approaches to the status

Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
Id.
See id. at 153.
147 See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Racial Gerrymanderingand Vote Dilution: Shaw v.
Reno in Doctrinal Context, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 517, 590-91 (1995).
144
145
146
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of fetal life.148 These scientific and legal disagreements tend to show that
the interest claimed by the State is not yet firmly established within
relevant domains of knowledge.
However, taken alone, this reading of Roe leaves too much
unexplained. In the relevant textual passages, Blackmun did not focus
his attention solely on disagreements about when life begins within the
secular disciplines. On the contrary, he primarily stressed the contents
of, and disagreements among, religious viewpoints about fetal life.
Unlike scientific and philosophical disagreement about when life begins,
the fact that religions disagree about that question has little relevance to
the State's burden of proving a compelling (secular) interest in
protecting fetal life. Blackmun's emphasis on religious disagreements,
therefore, is best understood as suggesting that religious purposes, and
not secular ones, lie underneath anti-abortion laws.
Furthermore, Blackmun's references to (among other things) the
"sensitive" nature of the question when life begins and the "vigorous
opposing views" and "seemingly absolute convictions" that people hold
about abortion reveal his anxiety about the corrosive social and political
effects of the divisions surrounding abortion.149 By revolving the
introductory section of his opinion around these themes, Blackmun
indicated that the management and amelioration of religiously charged
political disagreement was one of the central challenges presented by the
case and a primary goal that he sought to achieve in resolving it the way
he did. These concerns have little to do with the State's burden of proof,
and are much better explained by the UEC interpretation of Roe.
6. The Beginnings of a Contradiction
The previous discussion explains why the Court refused to say when
life begins and, by doing so, rejected the government's interest in
protecting fetal life against homicide. Yet Blackmun did not reject all
governmental reasons for restricting abortion: he recognized the "less
rigid claim" that the state may protect the "potentiallife" of the fetus.o50
This sub-section explores Blackmun's potential-life concept and shows
how it relates to the UEC.

14I See Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-62 (citing Motion of American Ethical Union et al. supra
126; LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOcRATic OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND
INTERPRETATION 16 (1943); FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMINGS JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS
note

1028-31 (1956); DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1689 (24t1h ed. 1965);
LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION, 97-99 (1966); DAVID M. FELDMAN, BIRTH CONTROL IN
JEWISH LAW 251-94 (1968); L. M. HELLMAN & J. A. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 493
(14th ed. 1971); WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 335-38 (4th ed. 1971)).
149 Id. at 116.
150

Id. at 150.
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Potential life-unlike actual life-is not a strong enough reason to
ban abortion throughout all nine months of pregnancy. Nonetheless,
according to Blackmun, the government's interest in potential life grows
stronger as the fetus develops, and at the point of viability
(approximately the third trimester), the interest in potential life becomes
"compelling." From that point on, Roe allows the government to prohibit
abortion, except to protect the mother's life or health. 15 1
At first glance, recognizing an interest in potential life seems to
avoid the problems Blackmun found with the State's asserted interest in
actual life. Unlike the disputed question of when life begins, everyone
can agree, at the very least, that potential life is present throughout all
of pregnancy: the embryo or fetus, whatever it might be currently
("person" or not), it will indisputably become what we all recognize as
human life unless it dies. The potential-life concept, therefore, enabled
Blackmun to recognize some sort of state interest in the fetus without
appearing to engage in controversial metaphysical or religious
speculation about when life begins.
However, this first appearance is deceiving. Although everyone
agrees that potential life exists throughout pregnancy, people do not
agree about why, how much, or when we should value potential life. In
fact, if the potential life is not already, in some sense, an actual life, it is
not clear why we should value it at all. Given the ambiguous, and
probably empty, value of potential life, we should expect that people who
believe the fetus is an actual human life will place a high value on its socalled potential life, and people who think otherwise will place little or
no value on the fetus's potential.152
For Blackmun, the potential life of the developing fetus becomes
valuable enough for the government to protect it at the point of
viability.15 3 He provided no justification for selecting viability as the
crucial moment in fetal development, apart from a brief explanation that
is nothing more than a tautology.154 Nor could he provide a substantive
at 162-64.
See Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life Begins at
Conception," 43 STAN. L. REV. 599, 600 (1991) ("If the fetus is considered solely as a
'potential' person, no case for a compelling state interest can be made without covertly
treating this supposed 'potentiality' as an actuality . . .
153 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
154 The sole justification Blackmun provided for selecting viability is the following:
"[The 'compelling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has
the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of
fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications." Id. This
argument tautologically defends viability by defining it; other than providing a definition of
fetal viability (i.e., the point where the fetus has 'capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb'), Blackmun makes no effort to show why viability, defined in this way, is
morally significant. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
151 Id.
152
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justification for selecting viability, because any such justification would
make it obvious that Blackmun was effectively answering the forbidden
question of when life begins, or, at least, when life becomes valuable. It
is no coincidence that (approximately) viability is the point where most
liberal commentators say that the fetus becomes an actual human being,
or, more precisely, when it becomes a morally significant entity
possessing rights apart from its mother.155 This non-coincidence strongly
suggests that Blackmun was using potential life as a cover for his
judgment that the fetus's humanity becomes actual or morally relevant
at viability.
Thus, despite Blackmun's effort to tell us that he "need not resolve
the difficult question of when life begins,"156 and to justify that claim by
using the UEC, he effectively did make a decision about when human
life begins. This decision, like the UEC itself, happened underground:
under the faqade of the potential-life concept.
Thus, two features of Blackmun's argument-the UEC and
potential life-are essential to the holding and scope of Roe, yet they are
in severe tension with each other. In the 1980s, this tension would be
exploited by abortion opponents on the Court, who embraced and
expanded the potential-life concept as a way to turn Roe against itself.
Before I address those arguments (in Part II.C), I must address a case
that the Court decided in the period between Roe and the jurisprudential
counterattack that began in the mid-1980s. That case, which further
defines the contours of the UEC, is the subject of the next Section.
B. Harris v. McCrae and the Complex Structure of the Underground
Establishment Clause
Harris v. McCrae is crucial for understanding the Roe UEC, because
the Court was presented with-and rejected-a direct Establishment
Clause challenge to a routinely re-enacted abortion restriction called the
Hyde Amendment.15 7 This sub-section demonstrates that Harrisdoes not
contradict the Roe UEC, but instead clarifies some of its complex
features.
The Hyde Amendment generally prohibits the use of federal
Medicaid funds to reimburse abortions. 5 8 The challengers argued
(among other things) that the legislation violates the Establishment

Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 924 (1973) ("[The Court's defense seems to mistake a definition
for a syllogism.").
155 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
156 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
157 448 U.S. 297, 300-03 (1980) (describing the "various versions of the Hyde
Amendment" that were at issue in the litigation).
158 See id. at 302 (citing Pub. L. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979)).
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Clause because it privileges certain religious views over others,15 9 lacks a
secular purpose,160 and sharpens religious divisions' 6' that threaten the
"fabric of our society."162 The district court had given these arguments
extensive treatment in an unusually lengthy opinion,163 ultimately
rejecting them.164
The Supreme Court rejected the Establishment Clause challenge in
a single paragraph.165 A majority of the Court apparently considered the
issue an easy one, and none of the dissenters openly challenged this part
of the majority opinion.166 The Court recognized that disfavoring abortion
is consistent with the views of some religious groups and not others (the
factual basis for the political-divisiveness argument), but emphasized
that this alone does not make the legislation unconstitutional. 167
According to the Court, abortion restrictions reflect not only religious
values, but also secular ones: "The Hyde Amendment . . . is as much a

reflection of 'traditionalist' values towards abortion, as it is an
embodiment of the views of any particular religion."16 8
The Court's cursory treatment of the issue is rife with ambiguity:
what are the traditionalist values the Court refers to, and why are they
secular rather than religious? In context, the Court appears to mean two
things. First, the Court's reference to traditionalist values is drawn
directly from the district court's opinion, and the district court meant
this: anti-abortion values are not necessarily religious because they are
159
160
161
162

See Brief of Appellees, supra note 7, at 68.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 100.

See McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 690-728 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 742.
165 See Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980).
166 They did not say whether they agree with the majority's Establishment Clause
holding; they did not openly reject it. However, they do use strong UEC language in the
course of their Due Process and Equal Protection analyses. See id. at 332 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Hyde Amendment is a transparent attempt by the Legislative Branch to
impose the political majority's judgment of the morally acceptable and socially desirable
preference on a sensitive and intimate decision that the Constitution entrusts to the
individual."); id. (lamenting the "encroachments of state-mandated morality"); id. at 348
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[The Government 'punitively impresses upon a needy
minority its own concepts of the socially desirable, the publicly acceptable, and the morally
sound."' (citation omitted)).
167 Id. at 319 ("[Ilt does not follow that a statute violates the Establishment Clause
because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions."'
(quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961))); id. at 319-20 ("[T]he fact that
the funding restrictions in the Hyde Amendment may coincide with the religious tenets of
the Roman Catholic Church does not, without more, contravene the Establishment
Clause.").
168 Id. at 319 (citing Califano, 491 F. Supp. at 741; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 13841 (1973)).
163
164
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not held exclusively by one particular religious group, but cut across
many different group boundaries.1 6 9
Second, in other parts of the Harrisopinion, the Court emphasized
that Roe only forbids the government from criminalizing or otherwise
penalizing the abortion choice; Roe does not say that the government has
to treat abortion just like any other choice. 170 The government is allowed
to make "'a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion,' and it
may "implement[ that judgment" by using its funds to support birth and
not abortion.171 According to Harris, Roe allows the government to
embrace traditionalist values that favor childbirth, as long as it does not
intrude on liberty by forcing women not to get abortions.172
If the Establishment Clause categorically forbade the government
from making any value judgments about abortion, the Court's analysis
would be obviously wrong. Any governmental action expressing a
preference for childbirth over abortion-not just coercive measures, like
criminal penalties-would be unconstitutional. Does this mean that
Harrissignals a retreat from the UEC framework of Roe?
This conclusion is not necessary, because the Roe UEC can be
reconciled with Harris. As the previous Section demonstrated, the Roe
UEC took aim at situations where the government effectively declares
when life begins by protecting fetuses against abortion to the same
extent that it protects born human beings against homicide. Roe did not,
however, condemn all governmental interventions on behalf of fetuses: it
recognized the government's
legitimate and secular interest
("legitimate," but not "compelling" until the point of viability) in
protecting potential human life.173
Likewise, when the Harris Court approved what it calls
traditionalist values, it was not referring to a governmental
determination of when life begins. In Harris (unlike in Roe), the
government did not need to provide a compelling interest, but only a
legitimate one. Harrisheld that the Hyde Amendment-which refuses to
pay for abortion with government money, but also refrains from

169 See Califano, 491 F. Supp. at 741 ("While Roe v. Wade argues for the measures'
invalidity under the Fifth Amendment at least, it does not make the enactments any less
secular in their legislative purpose. On its face such legislation, marking explicit
disapproval of abortion in most cases, reflects a general and long held social view . . . .").
The Supreme Court's majority opinion also hints in this direction by citing Roe, 410 U.S. at
138-41, which describes America's strong historical opposition to abortion in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See Harris,448 U.S. at 319.
170 Harris,448 U.S. at 314-15 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
171 Id. at 314 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
172 See supra notes 167-168- and accompanying text.
173 See supra Part II.A.6.
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penalizing abortion-does not violate the right to abortion.174 By not
violating a fundamental right, the government never faced the burden of
providing a compelling justification. Thus, the government never needed
to take a position on the religiously divisive question of when life begins;
it could justify itself on the basis of the less compelling, but also less
controversial, preference for childbirth over abortion.175
Thus, much like the Establishment Clause arguments about
abortion reviewed in Part I,176 the Roe UEC, as clarified in Harris, is
structurally complex. It does not reflexively condemn every possible
method the government might use, or rationale it might have, for
objecting to abortion. Instead, the UEC targets clear attempts by the
government to answer the question of when life begins by protecting
non-viable fetuses against abortion as though they were already fullfledged human persons. Harris,by permitting the government to favor
childbirth over abortion in ways that fall short of protecting fetuses like
full human beings, clarifies rather than contradicts the Roe UEC.
C. The Potential-Life Dilemma
After Harris, the next chronological step in the evolution of the
Supreme Court's abortion-rights UEC came in the mid-to-late-1980s,
when the conservative justices on the Court reclaimed the potential-life
concept from Roe and expanded it in ways that threatened to undermine
the UEC. This Section traces the attempt by anti-abortion members of
the Court to destroy the Roe UEC from within, and how Justice Stevens
developed his explicit Establishment Clause case for abortion rights in
response to the conservative critique. I conclude by documenting the
approving reaction that Stevens's argument received from several major
proponents of the Roe UEC, including Blackmun himself.
1. Recap of the Tension Between "Potential Life" and the Roe UEC
As I explained previously, Roe's UEC suffered from a central
contradiction from the beginning. Roe held that the government could
not answer the question of when life begins, declare fetuses to be human
lives, and protect them accordingly by banning abortion. Instead, the
Court recognized the validity of a lesser state interest: the interest in
promoting potential life. This alternative appeared to avoid the
controversy surrounding the question of when life begins, because
everyone can agree that an embryo or a fetus is, at the very least,
potentially a human life.177
See Harris,448 U.S. at 314-15.
See id. at 314 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
176 See supra Part I.B.
177 See supra Part II.A.6.
174
175
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Yet the problem resurfaces when we try to define why, to what
extent, and when potential life is valuable. Blackmun said that viability
marks the point where potential life becomes valuable enough to
constitute a compelling state interest. Without saying so explicitly,
Blackmun effectively joined the chorus of liberal scholars who argue that
viability (or approximately viability) marks the beginning of human
personhood. Thus, his (underground) pronouncement that fetuses
become valuable members of the human community at the point of
viability is in direct tension with the Roe UEC.178
2. The Collapse of the Potential-Life Framework
The contradictions within Blackmun's potential-life framework left
Roe vulnerable to attack from multiple angles. One possible line of
attack was to agree with Blackmun that potential life is a compelling
state interest, but stretch the meaning of potential life to include all fetal
and embryonic life. Potential life is an inherently expansive concept:
even if actual human personhood does not begin until approximately
viability (as Blackmun implied), the newly conceived embryo (and
probably even sperm and eggs before conception) undoubtedly qualifies
as a potential human life. 79 Thus, a small and logical adjustment to
Roe-extending the post-viability compelling interest in potential life to
cover all post-conception potential lives-would justify comprehensive
prohibition of abortion, completely erasing the right recognized in Roe.8 0
This simple but devastating modification to Roe was first proposed
by a member of the Court during the early 1980s, and it quickly gained
momentum and became one of the most important threats to the
constitutional right to abortion. In Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Justice O'Connor argued in dissent that "potential
life is no less potential in the first weeks of pregnancy than it is at
viability or afterward. At any stage in pregnancy, there is the potential
for human life."181 O'Connor embraced and extended the concept of
potential life, arguing that the state has a "compelling" interest in
82
protecting potential human life "throughout the pregnancy."1

See id.
179 See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 152, at 613 ('[Pjotential life' does not begin at
conception any more than it begins at viability. Accordingly, if the state has a compelling
interest in protecting 'potential life,' profound consequences follow. A state could forbid not
only abortion, but contraception as well.").
180 See id. at 600 ("By Roe's own logic, to hold that the state's interest in protecting
'potential life' exists equally throughout pregnancy is to hold that states may bar abortion
completely.").
181 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
182 Id.
178
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Justices White and Rehnquist picked up her argument three years
later,183 and in 1989, Justice Kennedy signed on by joining Rehnquist's
plurality opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.184 If five
justices had embraced the argument in Webster, then the Court would
have given state legislatures a compelling justification for prohibiting
abortion both pre- and post-viability. That would have signaled the end
of Roe.185
Proponents of the Roe UEC could not respond to this line of
reasoning. In fact, the UEC necessarily disarmed them of any weapons
they might otherwise have used to defend themselves. Any serious effort
to distinguish some potential lives (pre-viable ones) from others (postviable ones) would not truly be about potential life. Rather, such efforts
reflect judgments about how much the potential life resembles an actual
life. But resolving what constitutes actual life (when life begins) is the
very thing that Roe's UEC forbids.
3. Justice Stevens's Solution
Justice Stevens developed one solution to the dilemma, but, as this
sub-section shows, his proposal abandons important elements of Roe's
UEC. In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists,186 he began to develop his above-ground Establishment
Clause argument as a response to the conservative justices' expansion of
the potential-life concept. Specifically, he was responding to Justice
White, who reasoned that because an embryo is just as much a

183 Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
785, 794-95 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
184 492 U.S. 490, 498-99, 519 (1989) (opinion of Rehnquist, J., joined by Justices
White and Kennedy) ("[W]e do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential
human life should come into existence only at the point of viability . . . ."); see id. at 532
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion "effectively would overrule Roe v. Wade," and that he agrees this
"should be done, but ... more explicitly"). Justice O'Connor, who had first introduced the
argument in Akron, did not advance-or deny-it in Webster because she believed the case
could be resolved on other grounds. See id. at 522, 525 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) ("I do not understand these viability testing requirements
to conflict with any of the Court's past decisions concerning state regulation of abortion.
Therefore, there is no necessity to accept the State's invitation to reexamine the
constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade."). If she had reiterated her Akron view, then the
Webster Court would have had a five-justice majority for the view that the state interest in
potential life is compelling throughout pregnancy.
185 See, e.g., id. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 555 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plurality opinion would
effectively overrule Roe because if "the State's interest in potential life is compelling as of
the moment of conception," then "every hindrance to a woman's ability to obtain an
abortion must be 'permissible"').
186 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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"potential" life as a viable fetus, the government's interest is just as
compelling at conception as it is in late pregnancy.' 87
Stevens replied that there may be a "powerful theological argument"
for the religious view that embryonic life and fetal life are equally
valuable.as Yet, according to Stevens, when we set aside these
impermissible "theological" considerations, it is "obvious" that the
interest in protecting unborn life "increases progressively and
dramatically as the organism's capacity to feel pain, to experience
pleasure, to survive, and to react to its surroundings increases day by
day."189 Judged only by secular standards, "there is a fundamental and
well-recognized difference between a fetus and a human being."190 This
distinction is supported "not only by logic, but also by history and by our
shared experiences."191
Three features of Stevens's argument are important for our
purposes. First, he made a much sharper and more explicit distinction
between the religious and the secular than Roe had done. He brought the
Establishment Clause argument above ground. This feature was to
become even clearer three years later in Webster, where he explicitly
used the Establishment Clause to strike down a legislative declaration
that human life begins at conception.192
Second, he circumnavigated the potential-life dilemma posed by
Justice White, but only by abandoning Roe's agnosticism about when
human life begins. According to Roe's political-divisiveness and ultimateconcerns UEC, the Court (and the legislature) must avoid answering the
controversial, quasi-religious question of when human life begins. 193 By
contrast, Stevens gave a direct, secular answer to the question: "there is
a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a fetus and a
human being." 9 4
Third, Stevens used a faith-versus-reason type of Establishment
Clause argument, which played a role, but not a prominent one, in
Roe.195 For him, the question of when life begins is not an inherently
religious question; some ways of answering it are religious, but other
ways are secular. Secular reasoning-"logic," "history," and "shared
187 Id. at 775-76.
188 Id. at 778 (emphasis added).
189 Id. at 778-79.
1oo Id. at 779.

191 Id.; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-33 (1973).
192 See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560, 571-72 (1989) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193 See infra Part III.A.
194 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 779 (Stevens, J., concurring).
195 For a more extensive discussion of the faith-versus-reason Establishment Clause
argument against abortion restrictions, see generally supra Part II.C.3, and infra Part IV.
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experiences"-tells us that post-viable fetuses are persons, and previable ones are not. 196
4. Reactions from the Other Liberal Justices
The other liberal justices on the Court have taken a cautiously
approving stance toward Stevens's argument. None of them formally
signed on to the three opinions in which he articulated his
Establishment Clause position.'9 7
However, three liberal justices (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall),
in an opinion written by Blackmun, quoted and embraced Stevens's
argument from Thornburgh. Confronted with the expansion of potential
life to cover all nine months of pregnancy by the conservative Webster
plurality, Blackmun said that "I cannot improve upon what JUSTICE
STEVENS has written," and he proceeded to quote, in full, the relevant
parts of Stevens's analysis. 98 Immediately following the quote,
Blackmun provided a "see also" citation to Roe, suggesting that he
viewed Roe as complementary with and similar to Stevens's
Establishment Clause analysis. 9 9
In his Webster opinion, Blackmun did not specifically cite the
Establishment Clause, just as Stevens had not in Thornburgh.Yet three
years later, in his partial concurring opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Blackmun again cited the relevant
part of Stevens's Thornburgh opinion. On that occasion, he openly
invoked the Establishment Clause against the government's claim that
its interest in fetal life is compelling before viability: "[A] State's interest
in protecting fetal life is not grounded in the Constitution. Nor,
consistent with our Establishment Clause, can it be a theological or
sectarian interest."200
None of the justices who signed those opinions (Blackmun, Brennan,
and Marshall) remain on the Court today. Still, it is revealing that three
justices who signed the original Roe opinion, including its author,
incorporated Justice Stevens's above-ground Establishment Clause
argument into their later defenses and elaborations of Roe.
196

See Thornburgh,476 U.S. at 779 (Stevens, J., concurring).

197 See id. at 772, 778-79 (Stevens, J., concurring); Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560-72 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 914-17 (1992)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
198 Webster, 492 U.S. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778-79 (Stevens, J., concurring).
199 Id.

200 Casey, 505 U.S. at 932 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (citing Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
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D. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
This Section discusses Casey, the Supreme Court's landmark 1992
abortion decision.20 Despite major revisions to Roe's understanding of
abortion rights, the Court left Roe's UEC fundamentally intact, and it
also added a new, distinct UEC argument. The opening section of the
plurality opinion strongly suggested that the goal of prohibiting abortion
is more about entrenching traditional sexual mores and gender roles
than about protecting fetal life. By re-characterizing the interests of
abortion opponents in this way, Casey dismissed those interests on the
grounds that they involve ultimate concerns that belong to the domains
of religion and the conscience of the individual, not politics.
1. The "Essential Holding of Roe"
In Casey, the justices split into several groups: two justices for
reaffirming Roe in unmodified form, 202 four for overruling it,203 and three
(O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter) signing onto a middle-of-the-road
plurality opinion, 204 which is now the authoritative legal text defining
the scope of the constitutional right to abortion. The plurality justices
defended what they vaguely referred to as the "essential holding of
Roe." 205
This so-called "essential holding of Roe" departs from Roe in some
very important ways. Although Roe acknowledged the state's legitimate
interest in potential life, it did not allow the state to advance that
interest until viability. 2 06 Casey, by contrast, emphasized that the state's
interest is legitimate throughout pregnancy and allowed the state to
advance that interest (up to a point) before fetal viability. 207
This change, however, does not undermine Roe's UEC. The Casey
plurality never questioned, reconsidered, or offered a rationale for Roe's
refusal to answer when human life begins. It adopted the potential-life
description of the government's interest without comment, 208 which, as
previous Sections of the Article have shown, is an important

201 See Casey,

505 U.S. at 833.
Id. at 912-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 92324 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203 Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 983, 999 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
204 Id. at 846 (plurality opinion).
205 Id.
206 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
207 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 876.
202

208

Id. at 870-71.
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accompaniment of the Roe UEC, which refuses to say when actual life
begins. 209
Although Casey did strengthen the potential-life interest by
allowing the government to regulate abortion before viability, the
plurality joined Roe in saying that the interest is not compelling (only
"legitimate") before viability. 2 10 As a result, states are only allowed to
regulate before viability in non-intrusive ways: they may not create an
"undue burden" until after viability. 211 Thus, Casey left the central result
of Roe's UEC-the refusal to recognize a compelling interest in actual
fetal life or pre-viable potential life-undisturbed and unexamined. 212
2. Casey's Additions to the Underground Establishment Clause
Although the Casey plurality left the Roe UEC intact, it also
expanded upon and modified the UEC in several ways. These expansions
are the subject of this sub-section.
The first modification that Casey made to the UEC relates to the
structure of Due Process doctrine. As I discussed previously in Section
II.A, substantive due process analysis proceeds in two steps. The first
question is whether a fundamental right is at stake; if so, the second is
whether the government has a compelling interest that justifies
violating the right. 213 Roe used non-UEC arguments to establish that
abortion is a constitutionally protected liberty, 214 and it only resorted to
the UEC to refute the government's claim that it had a compelling
interest in protecting fetal life. 2 15
By contrast, the portion of the Casey opinion authored by Justice
Kennedy 216 frequently blurred these two analytical steps and treated
them as one. He did so by framing most of the ethical dynamics of the
abortion decision-the reasons why abortion is a fundamental right, as
well as the reasons why abortion might be immoral-as quasi-religious,
ultimate concerns about the meaning of human life.

See supra Part II.A.6.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 870, 879.
211 Id. at 876.
212 This refusal to re-evaluate the core claims of Roe is unsurprising in light of
Casey's overall approach to the case: stare decisis, respect for precedent. See id. at 853-55
(arguing that stare decisis favors reaffirming Roe).
213 See supra Part II.A.1.
214 The Court primarily relied on recent Due-Process precedent and the "detriment"
that unwanted pregnancies impose upon women. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53
(1973).
215 See supra Part II.A.
216 For a discussion of who authored what in the Casey joint opinion, see JEFFREY
209

210

TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 54 (2007).
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In the course of explaining why abortion is a constitutional liberty,
Kennedy repeatedly alluded to the deep philosophical and spiritual roots
of the controversies surrounding abortion. He indicated that the key
question in the case (the "underlying constitutional issue") is "whether
the State can resolve these philosophic questions in such a definitive way
that a woman lacks all choice in the matter."2 17 In a well-known passage,
Kennedy proclaimed: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life." 2 18 He further argued that people of "good conscience"
disagree about "the profound moral and spiritual implications of
2 19
terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage."
Kennedy even implicitly identified himself with those who, for
spiritual and moral reasons, oppose abortion: "Some of us as individuals
find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that
cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all,
220
not to mandate our own moral code."
Kennedy's sympathy with the moral opponents of abortion was
unsurprising at the time, given that he is a practicing Catholic who had
once called Roe the "Dred Scott of our time," and who just a few years
before Casey seemed prepared to overturn Roe.2 21 In fact, after hearing
oral argument in Casey, Kennedy initially indicated that he was
prepared to join the four anti-abortion justices to create a majority
against Roe.2 22
What is surprising, though, is the way that he framed opposition to
abortion (including his own) as a moral and spiritual concern that cannot
legitimately be "mandate[d]" by the government. 223 The vocabulary he
used to describe the nature of the abortion controversy-as involving
"basic principles of morality," "profound moral and spiritual
implications," our "concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe," and
"philosophic[al] questions" that government may not legitimately
resolve224-directly matches that of the ultimate-concerns Establishment
Clause objection to restrictive abortion laws. 2 2 5 Like Justice Blackmun
did in Roe, Justice Kennedy used ultimate concerns-themes as a way of
mitigating the force of the State's interest in regulating abortion; but

219

Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (emphasis added).
Id. at 851.
See id. at 850.

220

Id.

217
218

TOOBIN, supra note 216, at 53.
See id.
223 Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
224 Id. at 850-51.
225 See generally supra Part I.B.2 (introducing the ultimate-concerns objection as a
response against anti-abortion laws).
221

222
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unlike Roe, Kennedy also (and primarily) employed ultimate concernsthemes as a way of showing why women have a fundamental liberty to
seek an abortion in the first place.
Kennedy's argument expands the Roe UEC in another respect, as
well. The Roe UEC targeted the government's interest in protecting fetal
life, holding that it must not seek to definitively answer the question of
when life begins. 226 By contrast, the bulk of Kennedy's discussion of the
"profound moral and spiritual" issues involved in abortion is not about
the fetus, but about sexual morality and gender roles.227 For example, he
analogized restrictive abortion laws to anti-contraception laws,
suggesting that objections to both are "based on such reverence for the
wonder of creation that any pregnancy ought to be welcomed and carried
to full term."228 Similarly, he indicated that when a government enforces
anti-abortion laws, it insists "upon its own vision of the woman's role,"
which is inappropriate in light of how "intimate and personal" pregnancy
and questions of gender role are for women.229
Thus, Casey left the Roe UEC intact and added new dimensions to
it. Roe used the UEC to emphasize the importance of agnosticism about
when life begins, which enabled the Court to reject the government's
interest in protecting fetal life. Casey did not question, or even comment
upon, this crucial component of the Roe UEC. Instead, the Casey
plurality fashioned an additional UEC-type reason to reject abortion
laws: such laws implicate ultimate moral and spiritual questions
regarding gender roles and sexuality, which the government must not
interfere with in our constitutional system.
E. A Retreat: The PartialBirth Abortion Cases
After Casey, the Court did not have to revisit the UEC until it
decided two partial-birth abortion cases in 2000 and 2007. Confronted
with and deeply disturbed by the phenomenon of partial-birth abortion,
Kennedy substantially backtracked from the UEC that he had helped
226 See supra Parts II.A.4-5.
227 This is not to say that his argument has nothing to do with the fetal-life

dimension of the abortion issue. He refers to it at one point in his summary of the moral
complexity of abortion:
Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others:
for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision; for the
persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and
society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist,
procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent
human life; and, depending on one's belief, for the life or potential life that is
aborted.

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
228 Id. at 853.
229 Id. at 852.
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develop in Casey, and even used language that, if taken to its logical
conclusion, would lead to a rejection of the Roe-Casey UEC. This Section
discusses the partial-birth abortion cases and explains how Kennedy's
shifting views threaten the UEC.
1. Background
As the previous Section discussed, Kennedy was never entirely
comfortable with Roe. 2 30 Despite his misgivings, he ultimately found the
decision palatable enough to join the Casey plurality and uphold Roe. For
the traditional abortion procedures at issue in Roe and Casey, the fetus
is located inside the womb and is generally invisible to the outside world.
The invisibility of the fetus within the womb makes it easier to speak
about the morality of abortion in abstract terms, as Kennedy did in
Casey: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life."231

The partial-birth-abortion issue shattered the abstraction that
helped make abortion rights acceptable to Kennedy. By the year 2000,
when Stenberg v. Carhart came before the Supreme Court,
approximately thirty states had banned the dilation-and-extraction
(D&X) abortion method. 232 Unlike traditional abortion techniques, D&X
involves delivering a live fetus into the birth canal, leaving only the head
undelivered. The abortionist then punctures the fetus's head and
vacuums out its contents before finishing the delivery of the dead
fetus. 233
Whether this gruesome technique is morally different from
traditional abortion is a controversial question in both pro-life and prochoice circles.234 Whatever the true answer to that question, the
230
231
232
233

See supraPart II.D.2.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 978-79 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Professor Cynthia Gorvey summarizes the procedure in the following way:

[The abortionist uses forceps to pull a living baby feet-first through the
birth canal until the baby's body is exposed, leaving only the head just within
the uterus. The abortionist then forces surgical scissors into the base of the
baby's skull creating an incision through which he inserts a suction tube to
evacuate the brain tissue from the baby's skull. The evacuation of this tissue
causes the skull to collapse, allowing the baby's head to be pulled from the
birth canal.
Cynthia Gorney, Gambling with Abortion: Why Both Sides Think They Have Everything to
Lose, HARPER'S, Nov. 2004, at 33, 34.
234 Many pro-choice citizens join pro-lifers to condemn partial birth abortion because
it is too '"close to infanticide."' See, e.g., Barbara Vobejda & David Brown, Harsh Details
Shift Tenor of Abortion Fight: Both Sides Bend Facts On Late-Term Procedure, WASH.
POST, Sept. 17, 1996, at Al, A8 (quoting pro-choice Senator Patrick Moynihan). On the
other hand, many on the pro-life side say that partial-birth abortion is no more terrible
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procedure certainly looks different: we can see a part of the fetus, in our
world and outside of the world of the womb, at the time that its life is
ended. 235 When the fetus's life is being terminated outside of the
seemingly foreign space of the womb, the question of fetal life becomes
more dramatic, more urgent, and less abstract. If traditional abortion
does not already look like infanticide, partial-birth abortion certainly
does.
This does not mean, as a philosophical matter, that it actually is
infanticide: I am speaking only of aesthetics here. Nonetheless,
aesthetics often influence our ethical judgments, and the distinction
between traditional and partial-birth abortion, whether purely aesthetic
or morally relevant, is a vastly important one for Justice Kennedy.
2. Stenberg v. Carhart
When the Court struck down Nebraska's partial birth abortion ban
in Stenberg, Justice Kennedy vigorously dissented. There was no trace of
his lofty account of liberty in Casey, or his previous characterization of
the abortion debate as centering on controversial issues about gender
roles and sexual morality. Furthermore, he made the important
rhetorical choice to speak of the fetus as a human life rather than the
2 36
preferred UEC term: potential life.
He repeatedly referred to the fetus as "unborn" "life" and as "human
life." 23 7 Whereas in Casey he spoke of how the Court must not "mandate
[its] own moral code," and the legislature must not resolve
"philosophic[al] questions" reserved to individual conscience, 238 here he
approved the "moral judgment" of Nebraska that "all life, including the
239
life of the unborn, is to be respected."
He declared that legislatures must be allowed to "promote the life of
2
the unborn and to ensure respect for all human life and its potential." 40
He described the D&X procedure as one that "many decent and civilized
people find so abhorrent" as to be one of the "most serious of crimes
than traditional abortion: both procedures kill the fetus; the only difference is the fetus's
location at the time it is killed. See, e.g., Richard Stith, Location and Life: How Stenberg v.
Carhart Undercut Roe v. Wade, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 255, 267-68 (2003).
235 Stith, supra note 234, at 267.
236 See generally Helen M. Alvar6, Gonzales v. Carhart: BringingAbortion Law Back
into the Family Law Fold, 69 MONT. L. REV. 409, 409-10 (2008) ("[Tlhe Court's preGonzales abortion opinions were distinctly uncomfortable with language explicitly
including fetal life within the category of human life. The opinions lack both internal
consistency and consistency with each other in their use of language about fetuses.").
237 See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
238 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992) (plurality opinion); see also supra Part II.D.2.
239 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 964 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
240 See id. at 957 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (plurality opinion)).
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against human life."2 41 Furthermore, he chastised the Court for viewing
D&X "from the perspective of the abortionist, rather than from the
perspective of a society shocked when confronted with a new method of
ending human life." 24 2
3. Gonzales v. Carhart
Seven years later, the Court heard Gonzales v. Carhart,which dealt
with the 2003 federal partial-birth-abortion ban. 2 43 By then, Justice Alito
had taken over Justice O'Connor's seat, and the five-justice Stenberg
majority for striking down Nebraska's partial-birth-abortion ban yielded
to the five-justice Gonzales majority for upholding the federal ban.
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. Even though he had
dissented in Stenberg, his Gonzales opinion claimed to respect and
244
distinguish, not overrule, Stenberg.
Whether Kennedy's distinctions between the Nebraska D&X ban in
Stenberg and the federal ban in Gonzales make sense is hotly debated, 245
and it is not crucial for my point here. What is crucial is that the antiUEC rhetoric of his Stenberg dissent did make it into his Gonzales
opinion. He approvingly recited the congressional findings that
accompanied the legislation that the procedure will 'coarsen society"' to
"'all vulnerable and innocent human life."'246 In a particularly
controversial passage, 247 he dramatically humanized the fetus, even to
the point of calling it an "infant life" and a "child":
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love
the mother has for her child.

. .

. [Slome women come to regret their

choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained....
[Slhe allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-

241 Id. at 979.

Id. at 957.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132 (2007).
244 See id. at 154 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238
(1998)).
245 Compare Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term - Foreword:
Constitutions and Capabilities:"Perception"Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4,
84 (2007) (criticizing the Court's "bizarrely narrow" reading of Stenberg), with Christopher
Mirakian, Comment, Gonzales v. Carhart: A New Paradigm for Abortion Legislation, 77
UMKC L. REV. 197, 208-09 (2008) (defending Gonzales's distinctions).
246 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1531, Congressional Findings
(14)(N) (2000 ed., Supp. V)).
247 Compare Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the
Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1690-91 (2008)
(criticizing Kennedy's language for reflecting gender-based stereotypes and undermining
Roe and Casey), with Alvard, supra note 236, at 410-11 (praising Gonzales for recognizing
the emerging parental bond between pregnant mother and fetus, thereby making abortion
law more like family law).
242
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developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human
form. 248
Finally, Gonzales referenced and reinvented the crucial UEC
passages from Kennedy's portion of the Casey plurality opinion. As I
previously explained, Casey elaborately described the "anxieties," "pain,"
and "constraints" of pregnancy, and the deep "spiritual" implications of
the decision of whether or not to procure an abortion, in order to show
why the woman, and not the government, should make that choice based
on her own moral view about the fetus and her gender role.249
On two occasions, Gonzales cited and summarized this section of
Casey as standing for the proposition that "[w]hether to have an abortion
requires a difficult and painful moral decision." 250 Whereas the Casey
UEC saw the difficult and painful nature of the abortion decision (and
pregnancy) as a reason to minimize the government's role, 251 Gonzales
used the same underlying fact for the opposite end: as a justification for
governmental intervention. According to Kennedy, banning partial-birth
abortion protects women from making a "painful" decision "fraught with
emotional consequence" and thereby risking "[s]evere depression and
loss of esteem."252 The reason that Kennedy found it obvious and
"unexceptional" that many women would regret procuring a (partialbirth) abortion is that, unlike in Casey, he now conceptualized the fetus
as an "infant life," and the pregnant woman as a "mother" who would,
naturally and predictably, lament the death of her child. 2 53 Whether
Kennedy intended to do so or not, his Gonzales opinion substantially
eroded the UEC foundations of Roe and Casey by affirming the right of
the State to recognize and protect the humanity of fetal life.

This Part has traced the origins of the UEC in Roe's rejection of the
government interest in fetal life, its reaffirmation and expansion in
Casey, and the powerful retreat from the UEC in Gonzales. The RoeCasey UEC depends on judicial agnosticism about when human life
begins, whereas Kennedy's Stenberg dissent and Gonzales majority
opinion unequivocally recognize the reality and value of fetal humanity.
At present, the UEC hangs on by a thread.

248

Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159-60.

249 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852

(1992).
250 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 128-29, 159 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 852-53).
251 See supra Part II.D.2.
252 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159.
253
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III. EVALUATING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OBJECTIONS TO ABORTION
RESTRICTIONS

Parts I and II documented the Establishment Clause arguments
against abortion laws advanced by Justice Stevens, a number of
commentators, and, in the veiled form of the UEC, the Court. Up to this
point, the Article has been descriptive. This Part moves from the
descriptive to the prescriptive by rebutting the political-divisiveness,
ultimate-concerns, and faith-versus-reason arguments. I conclude that
the Court should bring the UEC into plain view, reject it, and revisit the
foundations of the constitutional right to abortion.
A. The Paradoxof the Political-DivisivenessArgument
Although political divisiveness is the most common type of
Establishment Clause objection to abortion restrictions, it is the least
convincing. The initial attractiveness of the political-divisiveness
argument lies in the strength of its factual premise: polling data and
casual observation unequivocally reveal that abortion divides Americans
along religious lines.254 There are exceptions to these demographic
patterns: some religious people and groups are pro-choice, 255 and some
atheists pro-life. 256 Nonetheless, the overall tendency is clear.
However, the argument fails because it attaches undeserved
political and constitutional significance to these religion-related
differences of opinion. The appeal to political divisiveness by courts to
identify Establishment Clause violations has been persuasively criticized
on numerous grounds, including that: (1) far from being a problem that
demands intervention, disagreements are an "unavoidable part of the
political life of a diverse and free people" and a sign that America is
"functioning well";257 (2) religion-related divisions and discourse are "not
necessarily more sectarian" or more troubling than ordinary secular
divisions; 258 (3) invalidating legislation on political-divisiveness grounds

254 A recent Pew survey found that in April 2009, 52% of Protestants, 42% of
Catholics, and only 20% of unaffiliated persons said that abortion should be illegal. Among
white Protestants, 70% of white Evangelicals said abortion should be illegal, whereas only
34% of white mainline Protestants said so. PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE

PRESS, AMERICANS Now DIVIDED OVER BOTH ISSUES: PUBLIC TAKES CONSERVATIVE TURN
ON GUN CONTROL, ABORTION 6 (Apr. 30, 2009), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/513.pdf.
255 See, e.g., Catholics for Choice, CATHOLICSFORCHOICE.ORG,
http://catholicsfor

choice.org/about/default.asp (last visited Aug. 26, 2010).
256 See, e.g., James Matthew Wallace, Atheist and Agnostic Pro-Life League
Homepage, GODLESSPROLIFERS.ORG (Jan. 1, 2007) http://www.godlessprolifers.org/home.
html.
257 Garnett, supra note 64, at 1670.
258 MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD? RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 4041 (2003).
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"chills the exercise" of political speech and participation by religious
citizens;259 and (4) judicial intervention to alleviate political divisiveness
often ends up stoking the flames of division because "deciding a dispute
on the basis of some abstract legal principle rather than on the give-andtake of legislative compromise" tends to "increas[e] the bitterness" of the
losing party. 260
The fourth objection is particularly telling in the context of abortion.
Many commentators have observed that "[1]egislative battles over the
issue of legalized abortion seem to have become more bitter and divisive
since the Supreme Court attempted to preempt the issue in Roe v.
Wade."26 1 As Mary Ann Glendon has convincingly shown, abortion never
became as divisive in Western Europe as it is in America, in large part
because the issue was handled primarily through public debate and
legislative compromise rather than judicially crafted constitutional
law.262 The contemporary state of affairs in America is frustrating not
only to pro-life citizens, who feel impotent to effect change through
ordinary political means, 263 but also to pro-choice individuals who are
"worried about Roe's demonstrated propensity to create backlash against
the Democratic Party and progressivism more generally." 264 Thus,
judicial invalidation of restrictive abortion laws on political-divisiveness
grounds presents a paradox: constitutional intervention has increased,
not decreased, the religion-related political division surrounding the
issue.
Finally, political divisiveness no longer plays a major role in judicial
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. For a brief period during the
1970s, the Court deemed "political division along religious lines" to be
"one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect."265 It is probably no coincidence that only two years
after authoring that opinion, the Court in Roe emphasized and revealed
its anxiety about the "vigorous opposing views" involved in the "abortion
259 Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The
Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. LOUIs U. L.J.
205, 209 (1980).
260 Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious
Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 830 (1984).
261 E.g., id.
262 See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 46-47
(1987).
263 Johnson, supra note 264, at 830.
264 Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing
Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1397 (2009); see generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (advancing
a general argument that court-driven social change in favor of progressive social policy is
ultimately ineffective).
265 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (citing Freund, supra note 22).
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controversy." 266 Yet as I explained in Part I, the law has changed on this
point: a majority of the Supreme Court has decisively rejected the
relevance of political divisiveness to Establishment Clause inquiry, and
the Court has unanimously agreed that religion-related political
divisiveness, by itself, is not enough to prove an Establishment Clause
violation.267 These developments help to refocus the First Amendment on
"legislative outcomes rather than political inputs, so that a statute's
constitutionality is not impugned by the mere fact that some people
supported it for religious reasons."26 8
B. Fetal Personhood and Human Dignity:An "Ultimate Concern" with
Diverse IdeologicalRoots
The ultimate-concerns objection to restricting abortion laws is
stronger than the political-divisiveness argument, but it, too, is
inadequate. Its central flaw is that, although abortion poses ultimate
questions about why we value human life, liberty, and personhood, a
pro-life answer to those questions can derive from many different ethical
and religious (and non-religious) worldviews. When lower courts utilize
an ultimate-concerns approach to defining religion, they consider three
different factors: (1) do the beliefs at issue try to answer ultimate
questions; (2) do those beliefs amount to a comprehensive belief system;
and (3) does the system of belief accompany external forms of religion,
such as ceremonies, hierarchy, and holidays? 26 9
To begin with the obvious, the ultimate-concerns argument about
abortion flunks the third factor of the test. No specific religious
hierarchy, ceremonies, holidays, or other external "accoutrements" of
religion are directly associated with pregnancy, abortion, or restrictive
abortion laws. 2 70 Pregnancy and abortion do, of course, have deep ethical
significance to many religions, but that is different from saying that
pregnancy or abortion are an exclusive part of the hierarchy, ritual life,
or other external features of a narrow range of religious groups. The fact
that abortion fails the third factor is not necessarily fatal to the
ultimate-concerns argument, because it is only one factor among three.
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind as we examine the other
factors.

266

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973); see also supraPart II.A.4.

267 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.

268 Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REv. 87, 89 (2002).
269 See generally supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the ultimate-concerns definition of
religion).
270 Cf. United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1502-03 (D. Wyo. 1995)
(providing an extensive list of the external features of religion), affd, 95 F.3d 1475, 148284 (10th Cir. 1996) (adopting the district court's method for defining religion).
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Most of the commentators who openly advance ultimate-concerns
objections to abortion restrictions, and the Supreme Court justices who
have done so under the guise of Due Process, strongly rely on the first
factor (fundamental concerns) and, to a lesser extent, the second
(comprehensiveness). Roe spoke of the "deep and seemingly absolute
convictions" people hold about abortion, and traced these convictions to
people's comprehensive belief systems: "One's philosophy, one's
experiences,

. .

. one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and

family and their values," and so on. 27 1 Casey likewise spoke of the
"profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy,"
and connected the competing views about abortion to "our most basic
principles of morality."272 Roe, Casey, and commentators are correct that
for any particular individual, his or her views about abortion are likely
to be connected with his or her comprehensive belief systems about
morality and religion (or irreligion).
However, the belief that fetuses should be protected as persons is
not limited to any single comprehensive belief system, or even a narrow
subset of related belief systems. That belief can be understood and
accepted within the framework of Roman Catholicism273 and various
within
Judaism, 275
Islam, 27 6
faiths, 274 but
also
Protestant
27 7
27 8
libertarianism,
feminiSm,
and even, as I will demonstrate in detail
later on, a quintessentially secular, post-Enlightenment philosophical
approach that elevates scientific reasoning and logic above
Roe, 410 U.S. at 116 (1973); see also supra Part II.A.4.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992) (plurality opinion); see also supra Part II.D.2.
273 See, e.g., Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation:Replies to Certain Questions of
the Day, VATICAN.VA/PHOMEEN.HTM (Feb. 22, 1987), http://www.vatican.valroman-curial
congregations/cfaith/documents/rc con cfaith-doc 19870222_respect-for-human-life en.
html.
274 See, e.g., THINKING THEOLOGICALLY ABOUT ABORTION (Paul T. Stallsworth
ed.,
2000) (collection of presentations by pastors from an ecumenical conference about
abortion).
271

272

275 See, e.g., DAVID NOVAK, COVENANTAL

RIGHTS: A STUDY IN JEWISH POLITICAL

THEORY 129 (2000).
276 See, e.g.,
ABUL FADL MOHSIN EBRAHIM, BIOMEDICAL ISSUES: ISLAMIC
PERSPECTIVE 135-37 (rev. ed. 1993).
277 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The
Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159, 170-71 (1973) (arguing that abortion violates John
Stuart Mill's harm principle and therefore can be legally prohibited by a libertarian
government); see also Libertariansfor Life, The Libertarian Case Against Abortion, L4L,
http://www.141.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
278 See, e.g., Paulette Joyer, Pro-Life and Feminism: No Opposition, in PRO-LIFE
FEMINISM: DIFFERENT VOICES 1 (Gail Grenier Sweet ed., 1985); see generally Feminists for
Life of America, FEMINISTSFORLIFE.ORG, http://www.feministsforlife.org/who/joinus.htm
(last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
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metaphysics. 279 My point is not that the premises of any or all of these
systems lead ineluctably to pro-life conclusions; that is clearly not the
case, as there are many sensible pro-choice adherents to these various
worldviews. Rather, the point is that pro-life views (like pro-choice ones)
can find plausible expression within a wide variety of comprehensive
systems and should not be seen as the necessary or exclusive property of
any particular system.
The fact that belief in fetal humanity can cut across the boundaries
of many different comprehensive systems severely undermines the
ultimate-concerns objection to abortion laws, because the first factorwhether the belief system addresses fundamental questions-is
generally not enough to invalidate a law. As the leading judicial opinion
on the ultimate-concerns approach explained, "[clertain isolated answers
to 'ultimate' questions . . . are not necessarily 'religious' answers, because
they lack the element of comprehensiveness. . . . A religion is not

generally confined to one question or one moral teaching." 2 o
This principle ought to be strictly maintained. Individual views
about many central political goals, including how (and whether) to
alleviate poverty, protect the environment, and safeguard human rights,
frequently derive from our deepest convictions and beliefs about the
nature and value of human life. Despite the fact that these issues
implicate fundamental questions-and, for any given individual, are
often answered on the basis of his or her comprehensive ethical-religious
belief system-any particular governmental solution to these problems is
likely to be consistent with many, though not all, comprehensive
worldviews. For example, using the welfare state to fight poverty
arguably fits well within Catholic, 281 egalitarian,282 or utilitarian
worldviews, 283 and it probably contradicts other comprehensive ethical
systems in which the first principles are self-reliance, freedom of action,

279 See infra Part II.C.
280 Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208-09 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring in the

judgment).
281 See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Welfare Policy: TANF
Reauthorization, USCCB.ORG (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/national/tanf206.
shtml; see also CATHOLIC CAMPAIGN FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, U.S. CONFERENCE OF
CATHOLIC BIsHOPs, PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR AND WITH THE POOR (1996) (explaining

society's duty to the poor according to catholic social teaching).
282 See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, How Should EgalitariansCope with Market Risks?,
9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 239, 263 (2008) ("Egalitarians support distributive
constraints that prevent the conversion of wealth inequality into an unjust social
hierarchy, and ensure that everyone in society has enough to stand in relations of equality
to others.").
283 See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Utilitarianismand Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL. 463, 468 (1979).
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or other libertarian ideals. 284 Even though the question of welfare relates
to fundamental questions and intersects with various comprehensive
systems, it cannot be said to establish any one of those systems.
Therefore, because regulating abortion, like promoting the welfare
state, is consistent with numerous comprehensive belief systems, the
ultimate-concerns UEC fails. By remaining underground, the Court's
abortion cases were able to frame the morality of abortion as a religious
issue implicating ultimate concerns, while avoiding the need to back up
its claim by proving that objections to abortion only make sense within a
narrow range of comprehensive belief systems, at the exclusion of other
systems.
C. Faith Versus Reason
1. Introduction: Evaluating the Objection Based on Its Own
Methodological Premises
Although the Court's UEC consists primarily of politicaldivisiveness and ultimate-concerns themes, and only marginal faithversus-reason themes, the latter is the most formidable of the various
arguments. To briefly recap, the faith-versus-reason argument allows
the government (and potentially courts) to answer the question of when
a fetus becomes a human being. The important caveat is that the
government's answer must be a secular one. Secular answers are those
that can be rationally justified by using only secular methods of
reasoning. According to the faith-versus-reason argument, secular
reasoning supplies no basis for believing that fetuses are persons until
approximately viability; therefore substantial protections for pre-viable
fetuses have no secular purpose.2 85
Numerous aspects of the faith-versus-reason argument are
debatable; this sub-section brackets several areas of controversy, not
because they are unimportant, but in order to focus the discussion. First,
the argument necessarily relies on the idea that even when the
government is trying to further an indisputably secular purpose (here,
preventing homicide against human persons), it may not use religious
knowledge concerning facts about our world that are relevant to
furthering that secular purpose. Applying this method to the case of
abortion, if the source of the knowledge/belief that a fetus is a human
person comes from religion, then that (religious) belief cannot justify
restricting abortion. Excluding religious knowledge claims that are used
in the service of secular purposes (here, the purpose of preventing

284 See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARcHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 152 (1974) (analogizing
redistributive taxation to slavery).
285 See supra Part I.C.3.
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homicide) is debatable, among other reasons, because it forces religious
persons to divide up the religious and secular parts of their mental life
as a condition for political participation.286
If we were to accept that religious knowledge may legitimately be
used in politics to further secular purposes, the faith-versus-reason
objection would be defeated. After all, there is no dispute about whether
preventing the killing of human beings is a valid secular goal; the only
question is whether killing fetuses qualifies as killing human beings,
or, put differently, whether fetuses are human beings. If it does not
violate the Establishment Clause to base political judgments on religious
knowledge claims (here, the claim that a fetus is a human being), then
the inquiry is at an end. In order to focus my criticism on a different
aspect of the faith-versus-reason argument, I will assume arguendo that
religious knowledge claims, even those that are relevant to furthering
secular purposes, should be excluded from political deliberation.
Even once the faith-versus-reason argument overcomes that hurdle,
the objector is still left with the task of distinguishing religious from
secular reasoning. Some religious believers, and postmodern nonreligious thinkers, believe that this task is impossible. They contend that
the Enlightenment's separation of faith and reason is a fiction, and that
ethical and even scientific knowledge is ultimately based on faith
commitments and non-rational worldviews. 287
This objection, too, would defeat the faith-versus-reason argument
by depriving it of any criterion for distinguishing "secular" modes of
analysis from "religious" ones. Again, instead of resolving this complex
objection, I will grant the elusive distinction between faith and reason,
286 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religiously Based Judgments and Discourse in
PoliticalLife, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 445, 480-81 (2007).
Were citizens and officials permitted to rely on nonreligious intuitions but
not to rely on religious convictions, that would constitute a form of implicit
discrimination against religious perspectives. Moreover, any religious
individual would have a hard time saying where his religious convictions left
off and what his intuitions would tell him apart from these convictions.
Id. But see Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and DemocraticSociety,
30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 701 (1993) ("If you are fully rational and I cannot convince you
of my view by arguments framed in the [non-religious] concepts we share as rational
beings, then even if mine is the majority view I should not coerce you.").
287 See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 170 (3d
ed. 1996) (arguing that scientific progress reflects "changes of paradigm" rather than
objective progress toward truth).
What compels one to [science] . . . is the belief in a metaphysical value, a
value in itself of truth . . . . [W]e knowers today, we godless ones and antimetaphysicians, we too still take our fire from that great fire that was ignited
by a thousand-year old belief, that belief of Christians, which was also Plato's
belief, that God is truth, that truth is divine ....
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 109-10 (Maudemarie Clark &
Alan J. Swensen trans., 1998).
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for the sake of argument, in order to evaluate the faith versus reason
argument on the basis of its own core premises. According to Justice
Stevens and other proponents of the faith-versus-reason argument, the
distinction between religious and secular reasoning is this: religion relies
on faith and intuition, whereas secular reasoning relies on "history,"
"logic," and "shared experiences."28 8 I will address each of these three
modes of secular reasoning to show how, individually and together, they
provide a cogent secular case for fetal personhood.
It is not my goal here to prove that the fetus is a human person, or
that fetal personhood is the only conclusion that can logically be deduced
from logic, history, and experience. Instead, I aim to show that there is a
debatable, secular case for fetal personhood. If I accomplish this limited
goal, it is not enough to justify criminalizing or severely restricting
abortion, but it is enough to prove that abortion laws have a secular
purpose and do not violate the Establishment Clause.289 With this
clarification in mind, I turn to the three major modes of secular
reasoning identified by Justice Stevens: "history," "logic," and "shared
experiences."
2. History
One mode of reasoning that faith-versus-reason advocates identify
as secular is historical reasoning. 290 This sub-section demonstrates that
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 779
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also discussion supra Part I.B.3.
289 Politics is pervasively debatable and debated, and many "secular" ideas compete
against one another in the marketplace of ideas. Some of these secular ideas are right;
others are wrong. Thus, an idea need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to
count as secular. It only needs to have some plausible secular basis. See, e.g., Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586 (1987) (observing that "the Court is normally deferential to a
State's articulation of a secular purpose").
290 In some ways, it is odd to treat the historical longevity of a practice as a mark of
its secularity; many outside of legal circles claim that precisely the opposite is true.
According to the gripping secular and progressive narrative of the Enlightenment, human
history is shrouded in darkness, religion, and superstition, which we are gradually moving
beyond thanks to the interrelated pillars of science, tolerance, and secularism. The
historical and traditional marks the unenlightened and non-secular, and the contemporary
generally marks the rational. See, e.g., AUGUSTE COMTE, THE POSITIVE PHLOSOPHY OF
AUGUSTE COMTE 25 (AMS Press, Inc. 1974) (1855) (dividing the historical development of
humanity into three "progressive" stages, with one supplanting the other: "the
[t]heological, or fictitious; the [m]etaphysical, or abstract; and the [sicientific, or positive").
Nonetheless, courts generally value history for a variety of reasons that are not
plausibly characterized as "religious." First, it is useful for constitutional interpretation: to
the extent that the goal is to discover what the Constitution's framers meant (which, of
course, is controversial), history helps us discover the original meaning of, or original
intentions behind, the text. Second, a nation's history unites it. Even if the roots of a
nation's historical practice were religious, respecting those longstanding traditions today
might further the secular goal of unifying society around shared symbols. And finally,
288
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history supplies plausible (though not indisputable) arguments in favor
of fetal personhood.
There are two ways that history might be used to create a secular
case for fetal personhood: a direct way and an indirect way. The direct
way is to show that for much of Anglo-American history, law and society
frequently treated fetuses like human persons and condemned abortion.
There is a strong case to be made for this view, but it is a hotly disputed
claim, with a vast amount of scholarly commentary on both sides.291 In
fact, most of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe was devoted to arguing
his side of that issue.292 The dispute is too large to resolve in this Article.
Nonetheless, the robustness of the debate tends to show that concern for
fetal personhood (and the opposing position) has some historical (ergo
secular) foundation.
Furthermore, history can assist the case for fetal personhood
through a more indirect route. Many skeptics and religious persons
contend (for different reasons, but their central claim is similar) that the
core ideals of American political theory-rights, equality, dignity,
personhood, and others-are metaphysical and/or religious concepts that
cannot be justified by secular reasoning alone. 2 93 Much of the secular
case that the pro-life (and, interestingly, pro-choice) side puts forward
depends crucially on these contested concepts.
This is where history offers decisive assistance. I do not need to
prove that those concepts (equality, liberty, personhood, and dignity) can
be supported by secular philosophical logic alone, because history places
them at the heart of American political theory. Protecting the equality
every generation cannot reinvent the entirety of human knowledge. History is useful as a
repository of human experience and of the mistakes and lessons of past ages. See, e.g.,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES

71, 83 (Max Lerner ed., 1943) (arguing that history is "the first step toward an enlightened
skepticism, that is, towards a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of [existing laws]").
291 For an illustration of several of these views, see supra note 117.
292 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-52 (1973).
293 See, e.g., 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY

BENTHAM 489, 501 (1843) ("Naturalrights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible
rights, rhetorical nonsense,-nonsense upon stilts."); ROBERT P. KRAYNAK, CHRISTIAN
FAITH AND MODERN DEMOCRACY: GOD AND POLITICS IN THE FALLEN WORLD 11 (2001)

("[Tihe distinctive feature of modern liberal democracy is a notion of justice whose
fundamental assumptions are the intrinsic worth and dignity of every human being and
the preeminence of the human species in the natural universe. . . . [L]iberal democracy is
unable to vindicate these lofty claims about human dignity . . . . Hence, . . . liberal

democracy cannot stand on its own and needs support from the biblical claim that human
beings are made in the image and likeness of God."); John T. Noonan, Jr., A Catholic Law
School, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037, 1042 (1992) (arguing that the legal concept of a
"person . . . can be philosophically defended, but which historically developed under
theological auspices, with human beings understood by analogy to the divine persons" of
the Holy Trinity); Steven Pinker, The Stupidity of Dignity, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 28,
2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/thestupidity-dignity.
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and rights of rational persons is one of the central animating ideas in
America's political theory and in its founding documents, such as the
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. 294 Those
commitments have shaped how Americans understand their identity as
a people.
Needless to say, there are grave contradictions in America's
historical self-understanding as a nation of liberty and equality, 295
including (among many other things) the institution of slavery and the
protections bestowed upon that institution in the Constitution. 29 6 Despite
these stains and inconsistencies, America's historical and constitutional
commitment to the equality of all persons is substantial enough to show
that such notions are indisputably "secular" for Establishment Clause
purposes. This conclusion does not directly refute the faith-versus-reason
objection to abortion laws, but it does show that equality and personhood
are valid secular concepts that abortion opponents may use as starting
points for moral and political analysis. The next two sub-sections do
precisely this, demonstrating how logic and experience can be plausibly
used to include fetuses within the category of human persons who are
entitled to rights and equal protection.
3. Logic
This sub-section discusses how
proposition that fetuses are human
advanced elaborate logical arguments
beings. These arguments are part of

secular logic can support the
persons. Pro-life scholars have
to show that fetuses are human
the complex, ongoing debate in

294 See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.").
295 See H. MARK ROELOFS, IDEOLOGY AND MYTH IN AMERICAN POLITICS: A CRITIQUE

OF A NATIONAL POLITICAL MIND 148 (1976) ("[T]he American people have no realistic
intention of turning the dream [of egalitarianism] into reality. In pragmatic terms,
Americans have only the most ambiguous commitment to egalitarianism at the operative
level, either in specific terms of the race issue or on general principles. At the operative
level, Americans are libertarians and are therefore not just tolerant but encouraging of
inequalities of every kind.").
296 The most prominent traces of slavery in the Constitution are the Fugitive Slave
Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No Person held to Service or Labour in one State,
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour. . . ."), and the Three Fifths
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (designating those who are not "free Persons" as "three
fifths of all other Persons" for purposes of apportioning votes among the states).
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philosophy circles about the morality of abortion. 297 For the sake of
brevity, this sub-section focuses on one part of the larger philosophical
debate.
The argument I examine here reverses the usual battle lines in the
abortion debate by embracing a scientifically accepted definition of when
human life begins, linking "personhood" to the scientific definition of
human "life," and accusing the pro-choice side of engaging in
metaphysical speculation unhinged from science by defining
"personhood" distinctly from scientific "life." 298 This contention is highly
relevant for the Establishment Clause dimension of the abortion debate,
because the tendency to privilege scientific reasoning over metaphysics
is one of the central dynamics of Enlightenment secularism.2 99 If the case
for fetal humanity can find a plausible home within the scientific, antimetaphysical tradition of the Enlightenment, then it has an airtight case
for secularity, and the Establishment Clause objection to abortion laws
decisively fails.300

For two examples, see Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, The Wrong of Abortion, in
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS 13, 13 (Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher
Heath Wellman eds., 2005) (arguing that human life is present beginning at conception,
and that personhood, too, is present because all human life has a natural capacity for
"development toward human maturity"); Don Marquis, Why Abortion is Immoral, 86 J.
PHIL. 183 (1989) (arguing that abortion wastes the value of the fetus's human future).
These arguments are the subject of ongoing and extensive debate. See, e.g., Dean Stretton,
Essential Propertiesand the Right to Life: A Response to Lee, 18 BIOETHICS 264, 264 (2004).
298 In a sense, pro-life anti-metaphysical arguments turn the Establishment Clause
objection on its head. Insofar as non-scientific, metaphysical beliefs are "religious" beliefs
and inappropriate for politics (as some of the liberal Establishment Clause arguments
suggest), it is the pro-choice position that would come under scrutiny.
299 David Hume colorfully expressed the anti-metaphysical spirit of modernity in the
following way:
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for
instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoningconcerning quantity
or number? No. Does it containany experimental reasoningconcerning matter of
fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing
but sophistry and illusion.
297

DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 165 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 3d ed. 1975). See generally PHILIP
WALSH, SKEPTICISM, MODERNITY AND CRITICAL THEORY 4 (2005) ("Hume's skeptical

empiricism is generally acknowledged as materialist and progressive, in tune with the
overall thrust of Enlightenment values and of liberalism as a political and moral
philosophy. It is hard-nosed, opposed to metaphysical system-building and directs
attention to the empirical limits and constraints on knowledge." (emphasis added)).
300 This does not mean that the pro-life position is ultimately correct. There are good
reasons to embrace metaphysical reasoning. See, e.g., YUVAL STEINITZ, IN DEFENSE OF
METAPHYSICS 2 (Noah J. Efron trans., 1996). My point is merely that anti-metaphysical
skepticism has good secular credentials, that the pro-life position regarding fetal life can be
powerfully supported by this sort of method, and therefore that the pro-life view of fetal
personhood can qualify as "secular."
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Justice White's opinion in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists contains the seeds of an antimetaphysical pro-life argument, and his dialogue with Justice Stevens
illustrates what such an argument would look like. In a surprising
sentence, White effectively agrees with one of Stevens's central premises
by saying that the question of fetal humanity is a "metaphysical or
theological question."301 Yet rather than condemning abortion
restrictions on that basis, he turns that fact against Roe, against
Stevens, and in favor of fetal protection.
He begins with the scientific observation that a fetus of any age is a
human being in the narrow sense that it is a "member of the species
homo sapiens."302 There is no serious disagreement on this point: it is a
bare scientific fact that embryology textbooks confirm303 and abortionrights supporters concede. 304 The real dispute is over whether these
human organisms are human persons-that is, do they have the types of
characteristics that we value in born human beings?
White goes on to say that any deviation from this scientific
baseline-any attempt to define the origin of human personhood at a
moment other than the scientific origin of life-is non-scientific and
therefore is a metaphysical claim. He argues that metaphysical linedrawing in this area is doomed to fail because "there is no [nonarbitrary] line separating a fetus from a child or, indeed, an adult
human being."3 0 White's reasoning places the burden of proof on the prochoice side to provide a clear metaphysical definition of personhood that
includes born humans but excludes (some or all) fetuses.
White does not systematically apply his anti-metaphysical
framework to deconstruct the numerous pro-choice attempts to define
human personhood, but many other pro-life scholars have energetically
done so. 3 0 6 Because Stevens is a leading proponent of the faith-versusreason argument, I will illustrate how these metaphysically-skeptical
301 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792
(1986) (White, J., dissenting).
302

Id.

303 See, e.g.,

RONAN O'RAHILLY & FABIOLA MULLER, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY &
TERATOLOGY 8 (3d ed. 2001) ("Although life is a continuous process, fertilization ... is a
critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct
human organism is formed when the chromosomes of the male and female pronuclei blend
in the oocyte.").
304 For instance, Mary Anne Warren's classic pro-choice essay acknowledges that
embryos are, biologically speaking, human organisms. She goes on to argue that the
personhood of the embryo does not follow from its biological classification as a human life,
because embryos and young fetuses lack the properties that define personhood. Mary Anne
Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, 57 MONIST 43, 55-56 (1973).
305 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 792 (White, J., dissenting).
306 See, e.g., Lee & George, supra note 297, at 15-19.
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pro-life arguments work by analyzing Stevens's proposed criteria for
human personhood.
Stevens asserts that it is "obvious" that the interest in protecting
embryonic life "increases progressively and dramatically as the
organism's capacity to feel pain, to experience pleasure, to survive, and
to react to its surroundings increases day by day."307 Based on these
criteria, Stevens concludes that there is "a fundamental and wellrecognized difference between a fetus and a human being."308
However, each of Stevens's proposed criteria for defining
personhood is problematic: if accepted as a metaphysical truth and taken
to its logical conclusion, each criterion would result in unacceptable
conclusions. To begin with, consider Stevens's reference to the
"capacity ...
to survive."309 Although Stevens only mentions this
criterion in passing, many pro-choice scholars who draw the personhood
line at fetal viability heavily emphasize the moral significance of
independence and survivability.3 10 Measuring personhood by viability,
however, implies that our worth as humans is measured by our lack of
dependency, our self-reliance, and our strength. Valuing human beings
for those reasons, taken to its logical conclusion, culminates in a brutal
Social Darwinist ethos in which the weak and non-viable, who are
dependent and cannot survive on their own, are dehumanized and
discarded. This inhumane result is unacceptable, particularly within the
egalitarian and welfarist worldviews that many liberal, pro-choice
persons generally embrace. In any event, it is difficult to imagine what
moral or metaphysical significance the technical capacity to survive on
one's own carries with it. Unless viability is being used as an
approximate marker for some other morally significant development
(such as the fetus's development of psychological consciousness, 3 11 which
I discuss further below), it does not identify a morally significant
characteristic that justifies a firm metaphysical basis for defining
personhood.
Similarly, Stevens's reference to the fetus's "capacity to feel pain"
and "experience pleasure" cannot be decisive or even particularly

Thornburgh,476 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 779.
309 Id. at 778.
310 See, e.g., Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, supra note 8, at 27 (arguing that
once a fetus can live on its own outside the womb, abortion unnecessarily kills a fetus that
could just as easily be delivered and survive).
311 Viability and consciousness do not coincide precisely, but many commentators
support drawing the line at viability on the grounds that it is a decent, if non-exact,
approximation of when fetuses become conscious. See supra note 103 and accompanying
text.
307
308
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important. 312 Causing pain or depriving pleasure from another person is
usually unjust and regrettable, but much less so than killing another
person. 313
If fetuses are human beings, then their inability to feel pain does
not justify ending their lives any more than the physical insensitivity of
adult lepers gives us license to end theirs. The basis for depriving fetuses
of their lives must rely on some criterion other than capacity for pleasure
and pain.
An alternative interpretation of Stevens's analysis is that he is not
emphasizing pain and pleasure as decisive in and of themselves, but
instead for what they tell us about whether the fetus is "sentient."314
Identifying personhood with sentience or other forms of advanced
psychological development is the leading approach in pro-choice
philosophical thought.315 Yet this criterion, too, results in disturbing and
dubious conclusions. When a person goes to sleep, or falls into a
temporary coma, we do not say that she is no longer a person, despite
her temporary lack of sentient awareness. 316 Much less do we say that
such a person is no longer morally equal to others, or that she has
temporarily forfeited her right to life such that we may kill her without
committing a grave injustice. Thus, a human organism need not have

Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).
The strongest counter-argument to this point comes from the type of
utilitarianism advanced by Jeremy Bentham, in which the only relevant criterion for
valuing human beings (or other organisms) is their capacity for pleasure and pain. See
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 310
n.1 (Hafner Publ'g Co. 1948) (1789) ("The day may come, when the rest of the animal
creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but
312
313

by the hand of tyranny. . . . What . .. should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of

reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? . . . [T]he question is not, Can they reason?
nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?"). However, instead of vindicating constitutional
principles (as Steveris seeks to do), endorsing Bentham's form of utilitarianism would
radically contradict the egalitarian and rights-protective orientation of American politics.
It would entail distinguishing the value of different human beings based on the intensity of
their sensory faculties and their level of happiness or depression. This is a result that few
would accept.
314 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 779 (Stevens, J., concurring).
315 Pro-choice philosophers generally agree that consciousness or some other
advanced psychological feature is crucial. They sometimes differ on which psychological
attribute is most important. Compare MICHAEL TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE 41920 (1983) (emphasizing "the possession, either now or at some time in the past, of a sense
of time, of a concept of a continuing subject of mental states, and of a capacity for thought
episodes"), with JEFF McMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING 260 (2002) (emphasizing the
possession of "certain higher psychological capacities" including "autonomy").
316 E.g., Marquis, supra note 297, at 197.
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present conscious awareness in order to have rights or to count as a
person.3 17
An additional reason to reject the advanced-psychologicaldevelopment criterion for personhood is that it would justify infanticide.
If we define human personhood in terms of the functional capabilities of
developed persons-self-consciousness, rationality, and so on-then we
are almost certain to eliminate the humanity of born infants as well.
Humans develop neither meaningful rationality nor a robust concept of
self until well after birth, so the pro-choice functional definitions of
personhood would justify "aborting" young infants.iis A small but
growing minority of pro-choice academics are willing to accept this
conclusion and to recognize infanticide as morally permissible under
some circumstances,19 but most still unequivocally reject the killing of
newborns. The refusal of mainstream pro-choice scholars to accept
infanticide, although highly commendable, creates inconsistencies within
the pro-choice metaphysical account of human personhood and gives
powerful ammunition to those on the pro-life side who seek to
deconstruct it.
The anti-metaphysical pro-life argument is not irrefutable, but it is
formidable. It reverses the burden of proof and makes it appear as
though the pro-choice side is the one engaged in the task of nonscientific, metaphysical, and arbitrary line-drawing. Thus, a major part
of the pro-life case can plausibly situate itself within the antimetaphysical tradition of secular reasoning.
4. Experience
Proponents of the faith-versus-reason argument also identify
"shared experiences" as another legitimate element of secular reasoning.
The usefulness of looking to "shared experiences" for determining
whether beliefs are religious or secular is ambiguous at best. For a
majority of Americans, religion forms one part of their overall life
experience, 320 and this experience is often shared through communities
317 The counter to my argument is that the capacity for consciousness, not actual
present consciousness, is the defining characteristic of personhood. But this counter plays
directly into the pro-life philosophers' trap. Their argument is that the fetus is a person,
because, even though it does not presently possess consciousness (like the sleeping person),
it has a root "capacity" to develop consciousness if it is allowed to continue its life and
growth. See, e.g., Lee & George, supra note 297, at 15-18.
a1s See, e.g., id at 18.
319 See, e.g., TOOLEY, supra note 315 at 421.
320 For instance, a February 2008 Pew survey found that 78.4% of Americans
identified themselves as Christians, 4.7% identified with non-Christian religions, and only
1.6% are atheists. PEW FORUM ON RELIGIOUS & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE
SURVEY 5 (2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscapestudy-full.pdf.
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of worship and through aspects of religious experience that are common
to many different religions and cultures. 321 Despite these problems with
using "shared experiences" as a proxy for secularity, I will set aside the
objection, arguendo, in order to focus on two core dimensions of human
experience that faith-versus-reason proponents would accept as secular:
sensory experience and relational experience.
Sensory experience, by itself, cannot directly say whether fetuses
are persons. Personhood is not a thing that we see, smell, taste, or touch;
it is a moral and philosophical concept. Still, sensation does provide
important data that we use as part of our overall judgments about
personhood. Traditionally, quickening (when the pregnant mother first
feels the baby moving inside of her) marked the moment when "a child
came into the family," resulting in "commitment" and "responsibility" for
that child. 322
During the past few decades, technology has enabled us to visualize
the developing fetus while it remains in the womb; as a result, the
traditional significance of quickening has been replaced with visual
sensation. 323 Both pro-choice and pro-life advocates appeal to visual
imagery to draw inferences about fetal personhood. For instance, many
pro-choice advocates appeal to visual imagery as a way to diminish fetal
personhood by referring to unborn life (especially embryos or early
fetuses) as a mere clump of cells or a "'tiny little spot of blood."'324 The
pro-life movement contests these descriptions of the fetus through a
variety of visually oriented methods. Pro-life literature and media is
replete with clips from ultrasound videos and graphically enhanced
pictures of fetuses at various stages of development. 325 Abortion-rights
supporters often criticize the visual emphasis of the pro-life movement

321
322

See generally MIRCEA ELIADE, PATTERNS IN COMPARATIVE RELIGION (1976).
Kathryn Pyne Addelson, The Emergence of the Fetus, in FETAL SUBJECTS,

FEMINIST POSITIONS 26, 29 (Lynn M. Morgan & Meredith W. Michaels eds., 1999).
323 See, e.g., Barbara Duden, Quick with Child: An Experience that Has Lost Its
Status, 14 TECH. Soc'Y 335, 341, 343 (1992).
324 Camille S. Williams, Feminism and Imaging the Unborn, in THE SILENT
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON THE UNBORN IN AMERICAN CULTURE 61, 69 (Brad Stetson ed.,

1996).
325 See, e.g., Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Foetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture
in the Politics of Reproduction, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD
AND MEDICINE 57, 57-58 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987) (explaining that in the 1980s, prolife strategists set out "to make foetal personhood a self-fulfilling prophecy by making the
foetus a public presence [in] a visually oriented culture"). The strategy has largely
succeeded: "the curled-up profile, with its enlarged head and finlike arms ... has become
so familiar that not even most feminists question its authenticity (as opposed to its
relevance)." ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE,
SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM xiv (rev. ed. 1990).
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for showing inaccurate (or accurate but misleading) images, 326 and prolifers respond by defending the meaningfulness and relevance of the
displays.327
Thus, both sides appear to agree that our visual interpretation of
fetal life is relevant to making judgments about fetal personhood. They
disagree about which ways of visually presenting and understanding the
fetus are the most accurate and revealing. My goal is not to say who is
correct, but simply to say that the disagreement is about shared
experience, not religion. It is about whether the pro-life visual
understanding of the fetus is true to physical reality or mere
propaganda.
Furthermore, the increasing availability of detailed ultrasound
technology enables pregnant women to visually encounter the unborn
child within her in a way that reveals its developing human form. For
many women (by no means all), this encounter changes their assessment
of the life growing within them and results in a change of heart about
abortion. 328 Many abortion-rights supporters cast doubt on the inferences
about fetal personhood that many women and families draw from seeing
an ultrasound of their unborn child. 329 Here, too, I do not seek to resolve
the dispute, but simply to point out that the disagreement concerns the
proper interpretation of ordinary visual experience, not religion.
Moving from visual sensation to relational experience,33 0 the bonds
that pregnant women form-or do not form-with their unborn children
326 See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the
Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 367-73 (2008) (arguing that ultrasound
and visual imagery about the fetus is not exclusively a visual experience; our visual
perception is shaped by political and social context, including the role of the sonographer as
interpreter of the visual display).
327 For instance, the Alabama legislature justified its legislation requiring that
women seeking abortions first receive the opportunity to see an ultrasound on the grounds
that ultrasound provides valuable information (part of the "informed consent" for the
procedure) that abortion doctors are unlikely to provide: "In most instances, the woman's
only actual contact with the physician occurs simultaneously with the abortion procedure,
with little opportunity to receive counseling concerning her decision." Woman's Right to
Know Act, ALA. CODE § 26-23A-2 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
328 See, e.g., John C. Fletcher & Mark I. Evans, Maternal Bonding in Early Fetal
UltrasoundExaminations, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 392, 392 (1983) (describing the responses
of several women who were considering abortion to their ultrasounds. One woman said, "I
feel that it is human. It belongs to me. I couldn't have an abortion now.").
329 See, e.g., Sanger, supra note 326, at 367-70, 372-73.
330 Relational experience is especially relevant for the abortion debate, because one
of the primary contributions that feminism has made to ethics is to emphasize the
centrality of relationships and connectedness with others as a source of moral knowledge.

See, e.g., ELISABETH PORTER, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ETHICS 7 (1999) (explaining that

in many strands of feminist theory, the experience of relationships is "fundamental to
ethics"). The major objection to using relational experience as a basis for moral knowledge
is that relationships tend to bias and prejudice moral reasoning, rather than enhance it.
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can be a powerful influence on their views of fetal personhood. Women
come away from pregnancy (and abortion) with dramatically different
experiences of and relationships to their developing child. The texture of
this experience can dramatically influence women's understanding of the
value of fetal life. Furthermore, these experiences shape the broader
society's conception and valuation of the fetus, because "[w]e see the
unborn through their mothers, if we see them at all." 33 1
For instance, in the case of an unwanted pregnancy, some women
(not all) view the fetus as an "intruder" and a threat to their physical
integrity and future.332 These ways of experiencing pregnancy and
relating to the fetus tend to dehumanize it; or, insofar as the fetus is
seen as having a human identity at all, its humanity is viewed as hostile
and foreign. By contrast, many other pregnant women experience a deep
personal bond with an unborn child whom they have already named and
already view as a full member of their family. As one woman expressed
it, "I became his mother long before that moment when I heard his first
cry," and "from the moment I knew I was pregnant, I was different-a
mother. I was aware of sheltering a developing life within my body." 33 3
This experience profoundly humanizes and personalizes the fetus.
Nor are these experiences limited to the pregnant woman carrying
the unborn child. The father of the child, new grandparents, friends, and
others may have similar experiences. Pregnancy and new life have
dramatic consequences-both joyful and daunting-for individuals,
families, and communities.
Ultrasound videos, fetal pictures, and a woman's sense of
relationship with her unborn child do not prove (or disprove) fetal
personhood in a philosophical sense. Nonetheless, for many people, both
pro-life and pro-choice, these dimensions of sensory and relational
Feminists have persuasively replied that skepticism of relational ethics reflects a
problematic, gender-biased account of moral reasoning, and that moral reasoning based on
relationships is not a "bias," but simply reflects a "different social and moral
understanding." Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of Self and of
Morality, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 481, 482 (1977).
331 Williams, supra note 324, at 61.
332 EILEEN L. McDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO
CONSENT 188 (1996). Similarly, fetal life has also been likened to a rapist, Donald H.
Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1616 (1979); a dying violinist

artificially attached to the woman's body, Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48-49 (1971); and other images that suggest the alien and hostile
nature of the fetus. For a collection of non-academic articulations of the experience of
pregnancy and abortion by pro-choice women, see Brief for the Amici Curiae Women Who
Have Had Abortions and Friends of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 1-2, Webster
v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605).
333 Maria McFadden, Motherhood in the 90's: To Have or Have Not, in THE SILENT
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON THE UNBORN IN AMERICAN CULTURE 115, 115 (Brad Stetson ed.,
1996).
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experience play an important part in forming our judgments about fetal
personhood. Because the faith-versus-reason commentators acknowledge
these types of experiences as secular and legitimate grounds for political
judgment, it follows that pro-life conclusions about fetal personhood (and
the contrary pro-choice ones, which are also rooted in experience) have a
secular foundation. Thus, "history," "logic," and "shared experiences"the three paradigmatic types of secular reasoning-can all support a
cogent secular case for viewing fetuses as human persons and protecting
them against abortion through political means.
IV. CONCLUsIoN
This Article brings to the surface, describes, and refutes a crucial
and virtually unnoticed dynamic in the Supreme Court's abortion cases:
a phenomenon that I have referred to as the underground Establishment
Clause, or UEC. The UEC is a complex collection of arguments and
rhetoric that originated in Roe and evolved over time in response to new
criticisms and challenges. Despite its variations and development, the
central feature of the UEC articulated in Roe has remained intact: the
government cannot prohibit abortion based on the idea that fetuses are
human beings, because that proposition is divisive, closely associated
with religion, and therefore inappropriate for political bodies to decide.
The UEC, as understood in this way, plays a central role in justifying the
holding of Roe and later cases, because it ruled out the government's
only hope for articulating a compelling interest for infringing the right to
abortion: the interest in protecting fetal human persons against abortion
in the same way that it protects born human persons against homicide.
However, I have shown that none of the Establishment Clause
arguments against abortion restrictions are convincing, and that the
government has rational and secular grounds for viewing fetuses as
human persons and protecting them accordingly. Thus, the Court should
bring the Establishment Clause dynamic of its abortion cases out from
the underground, and openly consider whether protecting fetal persons
against abortion is a "religious" goal that violates the First Amendment.
If it were to draw the proper conclusion-that protecting fetal persons is
a valid "secular" goal for government to pursue-then the foundations
would be laid for the Court to re-evaluate the essential question that Roe
refused to address: whether a fetus is a human being, such that the
government has a compelling justification for protecting it against
abortion.

